Creditors\u27 Rights Against Nonprobate Assets in Washington: Time for Reform by Andrews, Thomas R.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 65 Number 1 
1-1-1990 
Creditors' Rights Against Nonprobate Assets in Washington: Time 
for Reform 
Thomas R. Andrews 
University of Washington School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas R. Andrews, Creditors' Rights Against Nonprobate Assets in Washington: Time for Reform, 65 
Wash. L. Rev. 73 (1990). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol65/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright Q 1990 by Washington Law Review Association
CREDITORS' RIGHTS AGAINST NONPROBATE
ASSETS IN WASHINGTON: TIME FOR REFORM
Thomas R. Andrews*
Abstract: The increasing popularity of nonprobate transfers of property at death has
created a "revolution" in family wealth transmission. Yet the law on creditors' rights to
reach such transfers is badly confused. In some cases, exemptions from creditors' claims
are far broader than can be justified. In others, existing creditors' rights are protected but
undefined. In still others, it is unclear whether creditors can reach the property at all.
There is no procedure for the enforcement of such rights as creditors may have no speci-
fied time limit within which claims may be brought. This lack of system invites abuse and
is especially hard on involuntary creditors. The Author examines each of the most widely
used nonprobate transfer mechanisms: community property agreements, joint property,
multi-party bank accounts, United States Savings Bonds, life insurance, deferred compen-
sation benefits, trusts, and other transfers payable on death. Creditors' rights under each
mechanism are examined, areas of confusion identified, and specific improvements recom-
mended. The Author proposes that, excepting specific statutory exemptions, both probate
and nonprobate property be available to satisfy creditors' claims. He further recommends
that a procedure for providing notice to creditors be established in situations where a
personal representative is unnecessary and that procedures be established providing for the
appointment, when necessary, of a personal representative to handle claims against non-
probate property. Finally, he recommends an extended time period for the bringing of
claims against nonprobate property. The Author supplies a draft statute incorporating his
recommendations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Probate is the traditional method for winding up a person's financial
affairs at death. The probate court establishes whether the decedent
left a valid will and who is entitled to the decedent's property under
such a will after debts and expenses are paid, or under the law of
descent and distribution if there is no will, and issues any orders neces-
sary to transfer title to the appropriate recipients.
Nevertheless, there are a variety of mechanisms available for trans-
ferring property at death that avoid the probate process altogether.
The most common of these methods of transfer-usually lumped
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. Earlier drafts of this
Article have been included in the materials for two CLE programs, Creditors' Claims In
Decedents' Estates, presented by the University of Washington School of Law and the
Washington Law School Foundation on February 8, 1986, and the Mid-Year Meeting of the
Washington State Bar Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust, held in May 1989. The
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under the general heading of "will substitutes" or "nonprobate prop-
erty"-are life insurance, joint property held with right of survivor-
ship, joint and survivor bank accounts, payable on death bank
accounts, and pension plans. To these common will substitutes must
be added another of more local origin. Washington's pioneer statute,'
which has authorized for over one hundred years nonprobate transfer
of community property at death under a community property agree-
ment, appears to have been particularly popular in this state2 and to be
gaining acceptance elsewhere.3 Other variations on the same theme
continue to emerge.' Use of these mechanisms has become so wide-
spread that they are said to have contributed to a "Revolution in Fam-
ily Wealth Transmission," the "Nonprobate Revolution."5
This nonprobate revolution poses a variety of challenges to
lawmakers who, are concerned about fitting the law of decedents'
estates to contemporary reality. The probate code is an intricate web
of protections for decedents, family, heirs, legatees, and creditors.
Many-perhaps most--of these protections simply do not apply to
property passing outside the probate process.6 Each will substitute
1. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.120 (1989).
2. Price, The Transmission of Wealth at Death in a Community Property Jurisdiction, 50
WASH. L. REv. 277, 284 n.15, 317-20 (1975).
3. Recently similar provisions have been adopted in Idaho, Wisconsin and Texas. IDAHO
CODE § 15-6-201 (d)(1979); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 766.58 (3)(f)(West Supp. 1988); TEX. CONST.
art. 16, § 15 (1987).
4. Estate of O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d 913, 749 P.2d 154 (1988) (upholding a transfer on death
by an undelivered deed under WAsH. REv. CODE § 11.02.090, Washington's version of U.P.C.
§ 6-201). In another development that may usher in a whole new species of will substitute, one
corporation has recently made available a "transfer on death" form of security registration, and
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has amended the Uniform
Probate Code so that it provides for such a will substitute expressly. Wellman, Transfer-on-
Death Securities Registration: A New Title Form, 21 GEORG. L. REv. 789 (1987); National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Amendments to U.P.C. Article VI-Non-
Probate Transfers at Death, Part 3: Uniform TOD Security Act (1989) [hereinafter 1989
Amendments to U.P.C.].
5. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L.
REv. 722 (1988).
6. To name the most obvious examples: (1) The formal requirements for will execution
(WASH. REv. CODE § 11.12.020 (1989)) do not apply to will substitutes. O'Brien v. Robinson,
109 Wash. 2d 913, 749 P.2d 154 (1988); (2) The award in lieu of homestead (WAsH. REv. CODE
§ 11.52.010 (1989)) is not available against nonprobate property because the court is only
authorized to make an award in lieu of homestead from "property of the estate," and "estate"
there, as elsewhere in the probate code, means "probate estate;" (3) The statutory revocation of
testamentary gifts to divorced spouses (id. § 11.12.050) does not affect nonprobate transfers
because it only purports to revoke gifts in "wills," and a will substitute is, by definition, not a
will; (4) The automatic intestate share for spouses or children omitted from a will (id.
§§ 11.12.050, 11.12.090) is not available against nonprobate property for reasons similar to those
in (3); (5) The antilapse statute (id. § 11.12.110) does not-in most cases-save nonprobate
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needs to be studied by lawmakers and commentators to determine if
the expanded use of will substitutes requires amendment of Washing-
ton's present probate code to provide a more integrated approach.'
This Article examines one of the areas where probate traditionally has
played a critical role: creditors' rights in the assets of a decedent.
A. Scope of the Article
Payment of the decedent's debts always has been one of the princi-
pal functions of the probate process. As Blackstone put it more than
two hundred years ago: "[I]t is [the executor's] business first of all to
see whether there is a sufficient fund left to pay the debts of the testa-
tor: the rule of equity being, that a man must be just, before he is
permitted to be generous." 8 The probate process protects creditors of
the decedent by providing for notice and a mechanism for filing and
paying claims. It protects the legatees or heirs of the decedent by bar-
ring creditors' claims that are not filed in a timely manner and by
providing a mechanism for resolving contested claims.
How has the nonprobate revolution affected creditors' rights in
decedents' estates?9 The answer should be of importance to estate
planners, personal representatives, potential creditors, and those who
expect to receive property by virtue of a decedent's death. 10 This Arti-
cle attempts to summarize and, where appropriate, to criticize Wash-
ington law on the subject. Where there is no clear Washington law,
property for the descendants of predeceasing relatives who have been designated to receive it
because it saves gifts made by "devise" or "bequest" which, by definition, occur only in wills.
But see In re Estate GC Button, 79 Wash. 2d 849, 490 P.2d 731 (1971) (applying antilapse statute
to inter vivos trust); (6) Finally, as this Article will show, many kinds of nonprobate property are
not available to satisfy the debts of a decedent.
7. A new statute recently adopted in Missouri attempts to deal with many of the problems
posed by the expanded use of will substitutes. Nonprobate Transfers Law of Missouri, 1 § 17-43,
85th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1989) [hereinafter Nonprobate Transfers Law of Missouri]
(Senate Substitute for House Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 145). In addition, the
Conference of Uniform Law Commissioners is presently working on a new uniform act that will
attempt to provide unified treatment of probate and nonprobate dispositions.
8. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *511-512.
9. See generally Etfland, Rights of Creditors in Nonprobate Assets, 48 Mo. . REV. 431 (1983);
Fletcher, Adapting the Uniform Probate Code to Washington Marital Property Law, 7 Gonz. L.
Rev. 261, 293-95 (1972); McGovern, The Payable on Death Account and Other Will Substitutes,
67 Nw. U.L. REV. 7, 26-29 (1972).
10. Interestingly, one influential commentator has questioned whether creditors really care
about this problem. After an informal survey of professionals in the retail and consumer credit
industry, Professor Langbein has concluded that, although "creditors still elect their probate
remedies if outstanding debts are large enough to justify the expense of the court proceedings,
Langbein, supra note 5, at 1123-24, by and large, "creditors do not need or use probate." Id. at
1120 (emphasis omitted). His research indicates that large institutional creditors with relatively
small claims against a decedent (in the hundreds of dollars) depend on voluntary payment, or on
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law from other jurisdictions is offered to predict or flesh out the likely
result in Washington. In some cases, even though there is law in
Washington, law from other jurisdictions is discussed for purposes of
comparison and criticism. Finally, proposals are made for reforming
Washington law that could provide rationality and fairness to the sys-
tem of creditors' rights at the death of a debtor.
The Article focuses primarily on the rights of a decedent's general
unsecured creditors to reach property transferred by the decedent by
means of a will substitute. It does not consider creditors who have
acquired a lien on specific property during the debtor's life. Creditors
who have bargained for and received a security interest in the nonpro-
bate property should be entitled to assert their security interest against
the property regardless of who would otherwise be entitled to receive
the property under the nonprobate instrument in question.11 Credi-
tors who have perfected liens of other kinds against the specific assets
subject to a nonprobate instrument before the death of the debtor also
should be entitled to assert those liens against the assets as if the
debtor were still alive.12
The Article also assumes that the debtor has not declared bank-
ruptcy before death. If he has, then the property in the bankrupt's
"estate" will include all property subject to a nonprobate transfer inso-
far as the bankrupt could have enjoyed it during his life or exercised a
power over it in his own behalf. 3
security interests, to satisfy their claims. Id. at 1121-23. Moreover, none of the large creditors
with whom Langbein spoke "seemed concerned to trace nonprobate assets." Id. at 1123-24.
Why this should be so is not clear. We do not know whether creditors are indifferent to
nonprobate assets because many nonprobate assets are protected from creditors, because there is
no easy mechanism for pursuing nonprobate assets, or because such creditors routinely find that
their claims are satisfied in probate. Suffice it to say that creditors with substantial claims that
are not satisfied out of probate property should be interested in whether they can reach
nonprobate property. And on that general point, Langbein concedes that "will substitutes do
impair the mechanism by which probate protects creditors." Id. at 1124.
11. Secured creditors do not need to file a creditor's claim in the estate of a decedent to
foreclose on their security, Locke v. Andrasko, 178 Wash. 145, 34 P.2d 444 (1934), although
failure to file such a claim will foreclose the creditor's right to make up any deficiency out of the
decedent's probate estate, Storlie v. Sachse, 165 Wash. 291, 5 P.2d 342 (1931).
12. In re Hacketts' Estates, 120 Wash. 236, 207 P. 11 (1922) (judgment creditor may
foreclose lien of judgment independent of administration of decedent's estate); WASH. REV.
CODE § 11.40.130 (1989) (entitling lienholder to sell property of the deceased to satisfy lien).
13. 11 U.S.C.A. Rule 1016 (West 1984) (death of debtor does not abate a bankruptcy
liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7). The Bankruptcy Code includes in the bankrupt's estate
"all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property." 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (a)(1) (West 1979
& Supp. 1989). Section 70a(3) of the old Bankruptcy Act included in the bankruptcy estate all
powers which the bankrupt might have exercised for his or her own benefit. 4 W. COLLIER,
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 541-106 (5th ed. 1989). This section was not carried over into the
new Code. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1) (West 1979 & Supp. 1989). Section 541(b) implies, however,
Vol. 65:73, 1990
Creditors' Rights Against Nonprobate Assets
Finally, the Article generally assumes that the decedent has
attempted to transfer property gratuitously outside of probate. Insofar
as the nonprobate transfer was made for consideration, those who bar-
gained for and received the right to the decedent's property through
the nonprobate transfer should be entitled to that property without
regard to probate."4 Other creditors of the decedent should not be
able to reach the bargained for nonprobate property but should,
instead, be expected to be able to reach the property-the considera-
tion-in return for which the decedent agreed to the nonprobate
transfer. 15
B. Community Debt System
While there is not much cause in this Article to discuss the distinc-
tion between community and separate property, the Article will take
for granted the Washington "community debt" system under which
obligations normally are classified as either "community" or "sepa-
rate." It may, therefore, be useful to summarize briefly the system's
basic principles as they impact the estate of a decedent debtor.1 6
A "community obligation" is one entered into on behalf of or for
the benefit of the community of husband and wife.17 Debts incurred
by a spouse during marriage are presumed to be community debts.'"
All the community property, regardless of which spouse formally
incurred the obligation, is ordinarily held to be subject to "community
obligations" incurred by the couple during marriage."' This liability
of all the community property for the community obligations survives
that property subject to a power exercisable for the benefit of the debtor would still be includible,
since it excludes from the bankruptcy estate "any power that the debtor may only exercise solely
for the benefit of an entity other than the debtor." 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(b) (West Supp. 1989); see
also 4 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY §§ 541-107 to 541-110 (5th ed. 1989).
14. Claims for specific performance of contracts entered into by decedent need not be filed in
decedent's estate. Baird v. Knutzen, 49 Wash. 2d 308, 301 P.2d 375 (1956) (real estate contract);
Southwick v. Southwick, 34 Wash. 2d 464, 208 P.2d 1187 (1949) (contract to make a will).
15. In some cases, of course, the consideration for which the decedent made a nonprobate
transfer may be gone; or the consideration may have been services. If that is the case, the general
creditors of the decedent have no cause to complain. The decedent purchased services or
consumables during his life and parted with dominion or control over the purchase price at that
time. As noted above, however, the vendor of the services or consumables should be entitled to
enforce his or her rights to receive property through a nonprobate transfer, if that was agreed
upon. See supra note 14.
16. See generally WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMUNITY PROPERTY
DESKBOOK, ch. 6 (2d. ed. 1989).
17. Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington, 61 WASH. L. REV. 13, 116-117
(1986).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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the death of the first spouse, and in order to dispose of community
liabilities, the whole of the community property is subject to probate
in the estate of the first to die.20 Furthermore, all of a decedent's sepa-
rate property is fully subject to the decedent's separate debts and lia-
bilities.2 1 Any quasi-community property should be treated as the
separate property of the earning spouse for purposes of creditors'
claims.22 Finally, part of the community property also may be subject
to the separate liabilities of a deceased spouse in two important situa-
tions. First, the deceased spouse's half of the community property is
subject to his or her separate liabilities.23 Second, if one spouse enters
marriage with a prenuptial "debt," that spouse's marital "earnings and
accumulations" (even though the nonearning spouse owns half of
these as community property) are (1) fully liable for that debt if the
debt is a child support or maintenance obligation owed a former
spouse, and (2) liable for all other prenuptial debts that are reduced to
judgment within three years of marriage.24
Where both community property and separate property are liable
for the same obligation, Washington has adopted a "marshalling"
approach. Community property must first be exhausted to satisfy a
community liability before the separate property of the deceased
debtor may be reached,25 and separate property must first be
20. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 4.20.046, 11.02.070 (1989).
21. Northern Bank & Trust Co. v. Graves, 79 Wash. 411, 140 P. 328 (1914); Vetter, Liens on
Community Property, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY PROPERTY DESKBOOK § 32-13 (1977).
22. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.250 (1989). Quasi-community property is property brought
to Washington from a common law state that would have been community property had it been
acquired while domiciled in Washington. Id. § 26.16.220. It is treated as the separate property
of the acquiring spouse until death, but at the death of the acquiring spouse, the surviving spouse
is entitled to half of this property as if it had been community property. Id. § 26.16.230; see
Andrews, Washington's New Quasi-Community Property Act: Protecting the Immigrant Spouse,
15 COMM. PROP. J. 50, 53 (1988). The statute makes clear, however, that characterization of
property as quasi-community property "shall not affect the rights of the decedent's creditors."
WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.250 (1989). This can only mean that such property is to be
considered the decedent spouse's separate property for purposes of creditors' claims, since this is
what it would have been absent the recharacterization.
23. Estate of McHugh, 165 Wash. 123,4 P.2d 834 (1931); Edmonds v. Ashe, 13 Wash. App.
690, 537 P.2d 812, review denied, 86 Wash. 2d 1001 (1975); Cross, 61 supra note 17, at 145-46.
But see Fletcher, supra note 9, at 291 n. 119 (1972) (criticizing this rule). In addition to this "at
death" exception, if one spouse commits a separate "tort" (i.e. one not for the benefit of the
community), then the tortfeasor spouse's half of the community property is liable for the
satisfaction of the tort claim even while the tortfeasor spouse remains living. deElche v. Jacobsen,
95 Wash. 2d 237, 622 P.2d 835 (1980). The deElche exception, however, is of no importance
where the tortfeasor spouse has died, since the same result would attach because of death.
24. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.200 (1989).
25. Estate of Schoenfeld, 56 Wash. 2d 197, 199, 351 P.2d 935, 936-37 (1960).
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exhausted to satisfy a separate obligation of the deceased debtor before
any community property may be reached.26
C. Fraudulent Transfers
Some nonprobate "transfers" may be vulnerable to creditors
because the transfers are in fraud of creditors' rights. Under the Uni-
form Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), enacted in Washington in
1987,27 a gratuitous transfer is fraudulent as to an existing creditor if
the transferor was insolvent at the time of the transfer or became insol-
vent as a result of the transfer and did not receive "reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for the transfer."28 In addition, a trans-
fer is fraudulent as to an existing or a future creditor (a) if made with
actual intent to defraud the creditor or (b) the transfer is gratuitous
and the transferor reasonably should have believed that he or she
would incur debts beyond his or her ability to pay as they became
due.2 9 Finally, even a transfer to satisfy a debt will be fraudulent if it is
a preferential transfer by an insolvent person to an "insider" creditor
(such as a relative) who had reasonable cause to believe the debtor to
be insolvent.3" If a gratuitous transfer is fraudulent as to a creditor,
under UFTA, a creditor may set aside the conveyance, or obtain any
26. deElche, 95 Wash. 2d at 246, 622 P.2d at 840.
27. 1987 Wash. Laws, ch. 444 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 19.40 (1989)). The new
statute is based on the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985).
28. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.40.051(a)(1989):
A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim
arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if the debtor made the
transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the
debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.
29. Id. § 19.40.041:
(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether
the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(1) With actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or
(2) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or
obligation, and the debtor:
(i) Was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the
remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or
transaction; or
(ii) Intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he or she would
incur, debts beyond his or her ability to pay as they became due.
30. Id. § 19.40.051:
(b) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the
transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider [relative, partner, controlled
corporation] for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and the insider
had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.
Washington Law Review
other relief the circumstances may require for up to four years after
the transfer, or longer in some cases.31
In order to determine whether a nonprobate transfer is in fraud of
creditors under one of these tests, it is of considerable importance to
determine when the transfer is deemed to have occurred under the
Act. For example, a key, element of many nonprobate transfers is that
the transferor retains beneficial enjoyment of the property (and some-
times the power to revoke the transfer) until death. Indeed, this is
often what makes such mechanisms attractive as will substitutes. If a
transfer of that retained beneficial interest is deemed to have occurred
at the time of the transferor's death, then arguably any creditor of the
decedent should be able to set aside a gratuitous nonprobate transfer
that leaves the transferor's probate estate insufficient to meet his debts.
When is a transfer deemed to have been made for purposes of the
UFTA? The primary test under the Act is based on the concept of
"perfection." If a transfer can be "perfected" against creditors, then it
is deemed made when "perfected. ' 32  Ordinarily, transfers of real
property will be "perfected" when recorded. If "perfection" is permit-
ted, but not accomplished, then the transfer is not "made" until the
creditor brings an action under UFTA. On the other hand, a transfer
of personal property ordinarily cannot be "perfected" unless it is a
security interest that is being taken in the personalty.
Where a transfer cannot be perfected, the statute says that it is
deemed "made when it becomes effective between the debtor and the
transferee. '33 When is a transfer "effective?" The statute does not tell
us, but it gives us a hint in the definition of "transfer," which is said to
mean "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, volun-
tary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an inter-
est in an asset.",34 So a transfer of an interest in property is "effective"
when the transferor "disposes of" or "parts with" the interest. When
is that? It will depend on the particular kind of nonprobate transfer
involved. Nonetheless, let me suggest the following generalization: As
long as a transferor has retained the use of or power to revoke an
31. Id. §§ 19.40.071, 19.40.091. An action for intentional fraud under section 19.40.041(a)(1)
may be brought within four years of the transfer or, if later, within one year from the time the
transfer reasonably could have been discovered. Id. § 19.40.091(a). An action challenging a
fraudulent transfer to an "insider" under section 19.40.051(b), however, must be brought within
one year of the transaction. Id. § 19.40.091(c).
32. Id. § 19.40.061(1).
33. Id. § 19.40.061(3).
34. Id. § 19.40.011(12) (emphasis added).
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interest in an asset, the transferor has not yet "disposed of" or "parted
with" that interest.
Such an argument was relied upon by the New York Surrogate's
Court in In re Laundree's Estate.35 Laundree had purchased United
States Savings Bonds with a face value of $1950 and made them paya-
ble on death (POD) to his brother. At the time of his death, however,
he owed the New York Department of Mental Hygiene $600 and his
estate was insolvent. As the court analyzed the situation:
In view of the fact that the purchaser can redeem the bonds in his life-
time without the consent of the beneficiary it may be said that he
remains the owner thereof.... Viewed in the light of the relative rights
of the purchaser and the beneficiary it seems to me that there could be
no effective or operative transfer of title to the bonds until the death of
the purchaser. Up and until that time the transaction was ambulatory.
Thus, at the time when he intended the transfer should and did become
effective the transferor had thereby rendered himself insolvent. Where a
debtor makes a voluntary conveyance of property without fair consider-
ation while an indebtedness is outstanding . . . such a conveyance is
fraudulent as to creditors without regard to actual intent.",
36
Accordingly, the court held that the POD transfer at decedent's death
constituted a fraudulent transfer and ordered the brother to execute
appropriate documents so that the proceeds could be paid to the
estate.
Unfortunately, the Appellate Division reversed the lower court in
Laundree. 37 In a cursory opinion, it reasoned that under applicable
federal regulations, the beneficiary had acquired a present interest and
fixed right under the bonds at the time of their purchase.38 Since the
purchaser was not insolvent at the time of the purchase, it concluded
that there was no fraudulent conveyance at that time.39 What the
Appellate Division apparently failed to discern was that the benefici-
ary's acquisition of a "present and fixed right" in the bonds at the time
of their purchase was not incompatible with retention of beneficial
interests by the purchaser. What the beneficiary acquired at the time
of purchase was, at most, a vested right subject to complete defeasance
35. 195 Misc. 754, 91 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1949), rev'd, 277 A.D.2d 994, 100 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1950).
36. 91 N.Y.S.2d at 478-88.
37. Application of Laundree, 277 A.D.2d 994, 100 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 (1950).
38. 100 N.Y.S.2d at 147-48. The Appellate Division may have been reluctant to consider
seriously the state fraudulent transfer argument because the rights to the bonds was controlled by
federal law. This aspect of the case is considered infra text accompanying notes 132-39.
39. Laundree, 100 N.Y.S. 2d at 147-48. For a decision holding that no "conveyance" at all
takes place when a purchaser buys POD Bonds, see Reynolds v. Danko, 134 N.J. Eq. 560, 36
A.2d 420 (1944).
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by the purchaser were he to redeem the bonds before death. Thus,
there was still an important beneficial interest retained by the pur-
chaser and this was not transferred until his death. It was that trans-
fer which was fraudulent as to his creditors. There are a variety of
interests in any piece of property and some may be transferred fraudu-
lently even though others were not."
Even if it is legitimate to view some nonprobate transfers as not
taking place until death, however, it does not necessarily follow that
the transfer was fraudulent. Absent actual intent to defraud a credi-
tor, to establish a fraudulent transfer under UFTA it is ordinarily
necessary to show that the transferor failed to receive "reasonably
equivalent value" for the property.41 This will be relatively easy for
many nonprobate transfers. But some nonprobate transfers to surviv-
ing spouses, such as often occur pursuant to statutory community
property agreements, may be made pursuant to a mutual exchange of
promises. One spouse typically agrees that his or her share of the
community property will vest in the other at death, in return for a like
promise from the other spouse.42 Such promises may be considered
"reasonably equivalent value," rendering the transfer non-fraudulent.
Thus, in each case, it will be necessary to determine first whether there
was an interest retained by the decedent until death, and second
whether there was reasonably equivalent value received in return for
that transferred interest. Illustration of the implications that the
UFTA may have must wait until we look at the different kinds of
nonprobate transfer.
40. Further support for this argument can be found in the interpretation given to similar
fraudulent transfer language in the Bankruptcy Code. A number of circuits have held that a
fraudulent "transfer" may take place upon the foreclosure of a mortgage even though the
recording of the mortgage was not fraudulent. E.g., In re Huhm, 738 F.2d 323, 326-27 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Huhm, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); Durrett v. Washington
Nat. Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1980). But see In re Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. 469 U.S. 833 (1984). See generally 4 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 13, at § 548.08 n.10. These cases recognize that different interests
in the same piece of property may be transferred at different times, and that the transfer of one
interest may be perfectly valid, while the transfer of another may be fraudulent.
41. Britt v. Damson, 334 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 966 (1965). Britt
was a bankruptcy case dealing with an analogous provision of the federal bankruptcy code. The
issue was whether the award of a disproportionate share of the community property to a spouse
under a dissolution decree was a fraudulent transfer by the other spouse. The court held that a
transfer did take place at the time of the decree iiisofar as the amount of property received by the
spouse exceeded her vested one-half share. But it remanded the case for a determination of
whether the debtor husband received fair consideration by virtue of the release from marriage
and the limitation of future support obligations.
42. See infra note 68.
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II. THE NONCLAIMS STATUTE
Washington, like most jurisdictions, has a special "nonclaims stat-
ute" that establishes a short time limit for the filing of claims against
decedents' estates.4 3 As amended in 1989," the statute requires the
personal representative (PR) to give actual notice to known or reason-
ably ascertainable creditors of the deceased, and also to publish a
notice to creditors (with a copy to be filed with the court). Creditors
are required to file claims within four months after the date of the first
published notice or within four months after the date of the filing of a
copy of the notice with the clerk, or within one month after the date of
actual notice, whichever is later.4 5
It is unlikely that this claims procedure can be used to bar creditors
from reaching property that the decedent has transferred by means of
a will substitute. The question is important in two separate kinds of
situations. First, there is the situation of a decedent who has disposed
of some property by a will substitute, outside of probate, but for whom
a probate proceeding has been opened because there is some property
that will pass either under a will or in intestacy. In this situation, a
personal representative will ordinarily be appointed.4 6 Second, there is
the case of a decedent who dies without probate property, having dis-
posed of all his or her property by one or more will substitutes.
43. Decedent's Estate-Time for Filing Claims Against Estate, ch. 333, §§ 1-4, 1989 Wash.
Laws 1636, 1636-1639 (to be codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.40.010-.013).
44. The Washington nonclaims statute was amended in 1989 in response to Tulsa
Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988), which struck down as violative
of due process an Oklahoma provision with a "newspaper" notice provision similar to that
which previously existed in Washington. See generally Carrico, Washington's Nonclaim
Nonstatute: The Impact of Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope Estate on Probate
Creditors' Claims, 43 Wash. St. Bar News, Feb. 1989, at 7.
45. Decedent's Estate-Time for Filing Claims Against Estate, ch. 333, §§ 1,4, 1989 Wash.
Laws 1636, 1636-1639 (to be codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.40.010-.013). Even if no
notice is given to creditors, however, as a result of the 1989 amendments, the statute also bars
claims by "any person having a claim against the decedent who has not filed a claim within
eighteen months from the date of the decedent's death," provided that (a) a personal
representative is appointed within one year of death and (b) the PR has not lulled the creditor
into a false sense of security by partially performing on the obligation. Id. § 5, 1989 Wash. Laws
at 1639 (emphasis added). As with the existing statute, this language could be interpreted as
covering claims against both probate and nonprobate property. In addition, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 11.04.270, which provides that "[t]he estate of a deceased person shall not be liable for his
debts unless letters testamentary or of administration be granted within six years from the date of
the death of such decedent," survived the 1989 amendments. (emphasis added).
46. Strictly speaking, a probate proceeding may be opened without the appointment of a PR
if no such appointment is requested. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.20.020, 11.28.110 (1989). In this
case, the court makes an adjudication of testacy or intestacy. See infra text accompanying notes
56-57.
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A. Where a Personal Representative Has Been Appointed
In the situation where a personal representative (PR) has been
appointed, there is no question that the notice to creditors that is given
by the PR will serve to bar creditors who do not respond in a timely
fashion from sharing in the probate estate to the extent of their
claims.4 7 The question is whether the failure of the creditor to
respond to the PR's notice also will bar the creditor from pursuing
nonprobate assets transferred by the decedent. The statute provides
no clear answer to that question, although it does provide the basis for
several inferences.
First, the statute literally seems to bar "all claims" not timely ified if
creditors are given proper notice. The required notice instructs
"[p]ersons having claims against the deceased" to file them, and pur-
ports to bar those "claims" not fied in a timely fashion.48 There is no
attempt on the face of the statute to limit the claims barred to those
"against" probate property. This can be explained fairly simply by the
fact that most creditors' claims will not be limited to "probate" prop-
erty. Nevertheless, the breadth of the instruction to all "persons hav-
ing claims against the deceased" provides a basis for arguing that the
statute absolutely cuts off all creditors' claims not timely filed, so that
such creditors would not be entitled to pursue nonprobate property.
Nonetheless, there are counterarguments that can be raised. First,
the nonclaims statute appears in Title 11, which purports to cover only
"Probate and Trust Law." This suggests that the nonclaims proce-
dure is only intended to cover probate and (perhaps) trust assets. Sec-
ond, and more important, the section only provides for notice by and
claims to be served upon the PR or his attorney. This implies that the
nonclaims provision only applies to limit claims that could properly be
disposed of by the PR. Under Washington's current system, the PR
has control and authority only over probate property.49 It follows
from this line of argument that those who have no interest in pursuing
the probate property may not need to file claims in the probate
proceeding.
47. Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash. 2d 660, 453 P.2d 631 (1969); Graham v. Radford, 71 Wash. 2d
752, 431 P.2d 193 (1967).
48. Decedent's Estate-Time for Filing Claims Against Estate, ch. 333, § 6, 1989 Wash.
Laws 1636, 1639-40 (to be codified at WASH. REv. CODE §§ 11.40.010-.013); see also the
analogous language in the eighteen month bar from date of death, id. § 5, 1989 Wash. Laws at
1638.
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.48.010 (1989). The PR is given the duty of settling "the estate in
his hands." Nonprobate property, by definition, is not "in the hands" of the PR.
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There seems to be no case law testing the applicability of the non-
claims bar to creditors in this situation.5° But it would be relatively
easy for the legislature to make clear that the bar was intended to
operate in favor of both probate and nonprobate property owned by
the decedent at the moment of death, and to provide a procedure for
dealing with such property where a probate proceeding has been insti-
tuted. A proposed statute which would remedy the present uncer-
tainty in this situation is contained in an Appendix to this Article.5 '
B. Where No Personal Representative Is Appointed
The availability of the nonclaims bar is even more doubtful where
no PR has been appointed. Certainly where no notice to creditors has
been given, a claim against an estate is not barred by lapse of time. 52
But may those entitled to the decedent's property by virtue of nonpro-
bate dispositions take advantage of the nonclaims period by giving
notice without first having a PR appointed? There are two circum-
stances under which this situation might arise. First, those interested
in the estate may have sought and obtained an adjudication of testacy
or intestacy, without the appointment of a PR. Second, those inter-
ested in the estate may have filed no application for such an adjudica-
tion, but may have filed a notice to creditors in the form required of
PRs.
Read literally, section 11.40.010 does not appear to make the non-
claims bar available in either situation. The nonclaims provision pre-
supposes that there has been a PR appointed and imposes a duty on
the PR to give notice to creditors. It does not authorize anyone else to
give the notice, or to take advantage of the nonclaims period. Thus, in
Estate of Collins, 53 the court ordered appointment of a PR for an
estate upon application by a debtor so that a notice to creditors could
50. There is sweeping language in a few cases as to the effect of the creditors' claims
procedure in the probate code. E.g., Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash. 2d 660, 453 P.2d 631 (1969)
(creditor of a community cannot recover against either the community or separate property of
the surviving spouse when no claim was duly filed against the community assets of the deceased
spouse); Graham v. Radford, 71 Wash. 2d at 755, 431 P.2d at 194 ("RCW 11.40.010... contains
complete provisions for the filing and disposition of claims against estates, and no claim can be
enforced by suit unless a claim has been filed in accordance with the probate code."). But none
of these cases seems to have involved an attempt to reach nonprobate property.
51. See infra Appendix, Section I.
52. In re Collin's Estate, 102 Wash. 697, 173 P. 1016 (1918). In Meyer v. Dempcy, 48 Wash.
App. 798, 740 P.2d 383, review denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1009 (1987), failure to have recommended
the probate of an estate (that passed under a revocable trust) so as to take advantage of the
nonclaims period was alleged to have been malpractice by the probate attorney. Fortunately for
the attorney, the plaintiff had suffered no loss and so the claim was dismissed.
53. 102 Wash. 697, 173 P. 1016 (1918).
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be published. "[T]he fact of no debts can be established only by the
appointment of an administrator and notice to creditors ....
Nonetheless, at least one trial court decision has allowed a notice to
creditors without appointment of a PR15 The case involved a creditor
who sought to reach nonprobate assets after the parties had filed a
community property agreement, obtained an Adjudication of Intes-
tacy and Heirship under section 11.28.330, and then published a
notice to creditors under section 11.40.010. The trial court held that
the creditor, which was the state Department of Labor and Industries,
was barred from claiming any interest in the estate for failure to have
filed a claim against the estate under the nonclaims provision within
four months.
It would be dangerous, however, to place much reliance on this
case. The case was not appealed, and so there is no appellate authority
on the issue. More important, the parties took the precaution in this
case of obtaining an adjudication of intestacy, and there is some basis
for arguing that those obtaining such an adjudication should be able to
take advantage of the nonclaims procedure. Title 11 does contem-
plate that it may not always be necessary to appoint a PR, and autho-
rizes an "adjudication" of "testacy" or "intestacy" where a PR is not
necessary.5 6 In those situations, the person who has obtained the adju-
dication is required to give notice to heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
decedent; and if there is no objection, the adjudication is deemed final
after four months." While there is no analogous authorization in the
statute for those obtaining adjudications of testacy or intestacy to give
notice to creditors, it seems reasonable to conclude that the legislature
would have extended the protection of section 11.40.010 to such adju-
dications if it had thought about it. Assuming that such an interpreta-
tion would not extend the statute beyond its likely intent, it would
take a much greater interpretive leap to extend the same nonclaims
protection to persons who have not obtained an adjudication of testacy
or intestacy.
In any event, the issue is sufficiently in doubt to warrant legislative
attention. At a minimum, the legislature should amend section
11.40.010 to authorize those obtaining an adjudication of testacy or
intestacy to give notice to creditors and thereby to take advantage of
54. Id. at 699, 173 P. at 1016.
55. Department of Labor and Indus. v. Bums, No. 85-2-19777-1 (King Co. Super. Ct. Aug. 6,
1986).
56. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 11.20.020, 11.28.110 (1989).
57. Id. §§ 11.28.330-.340.
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the nonclaims bar. Ideally, a legislative procedure for notice to credi-
tors and a concomitant nonclaim bar should be made available to
those claiming property by reason of the decedent's death regardless of
whether a probate proceeding has been opened.58 If a specially short
nonclaims period is appropriate for probate property, there is no rea-
son to suppose it is not equally appropriate for nonprobate property.
Statutory expansion of the nonclaims period to nonprobate property
would enable the intended recipients of property to avoid probate
without the ensuing uncertainty as to creditors' rights that currently
exists. A statutory proposal designed to accomplish this result is set
out in the Appendix, and the proposal is discussed further in Section V
below.59
Until the availability of the nonclaims bar for nonprobate assets is
clarified, however, we need to assume that creditors are free to pursue
whatever nonprobate remedies they may have against such nonprobate
property without regard to the nonclaims period that applies to pro-
bate proceedings.6" Depending on the kind of claim, of course, there
will be other statutes of limitations that will eventually cut off even
these creditors' claims. The statute of limitations for some kinds of
claims, however, may be tolled indefinitely by such well-established
doctrines as fraudulent concealment, or the discovery rule. It is
imperative, therefore, to consider what rights creditors may have to
reach the common forms of nonprobate property.
58. A Missouri statute, for example, allows the trustee of a trust to publish notice to creditors
of a decedent settlor and to thus take advantage of a nonclaims bar. Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.6 10
(1983); see ABA Probate and Trust Committee, Rights of Creditors to Reach Assets of a
Revocable Trust After the Death of the Grantor-The Missouri Approach, 20 REAL PROP. PROB.
AND TR. J. 1189 (1985)[hereinafter Rights of Creditors]. Professor Fletcher has suggested that
nonprobate property should be reachable only by a PR with whom creditors' claims have been
filed. Fletcher, supra note 9, at 295 n. 131. The Nonprobate Transfers Law of Missouri, enacted
in 1989, adopts such an approach for nonprobate transfers other than trusts. Nonprobate
Transfers Law of Missouri, supra note 7, at § 40. This approach requires a personal
representative to be appointed even where there are no probate assets. It has the advantage of
centralizing (and unifying) the creditors' claim process. But in many cases it would add a layer
of unnecessary procedure in order to notify and bar creditors who did not respond to the notice
in a timely fashion.
59. See infra Appendix, Section IV.
60. Such claims may, however, be barred after six years if no personal representative is
appointed under WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.270 (1989) (quoted in note 45 supra).
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III. ANALYSIS OF CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN COMMON
NONPROBATE TRANSFERS
A. Community Property Agreements
For over a hundred years, marital partners in Washington have
been permitted by community property agreement to provide that a
disposition of some or all of their property shall take effect upon the
death of either.
Nothing contained in any... law of this state, shall prevent the husband
and wife from jointly entering into any agreement concerning the status
or disposition of the whole or any portion of the community property,
then owned by them or afterwards to be acquired, to take effect upon the
death of either.61
This statute has this, and only this, to say about creditors: "Provided,
however, That such agreement shall not derogate from the right of
creditors, nor be construed to curtail the powers of the superior court
to set aside or cancel such agreement for fraud or under some other
recognized head of equity jurisdiction, at the suit of either party."'62
As (now Justice) Robert Brachtenbach has tersely observed, this lan-
guage, in its "naive simplicity... does not define what rights the cred-
itors have, nor does it provide any procedure for the creditor to
enforce those rights."'63
How do we decide what rights have been preserved by this lan-
guage? There are two possible interpretations. The first is what I
would call the narrow interpretation. It depends on a literal reading of
the provision and goes like this: The statute does no more than protect
the rights of creditors in existence at the time the agreement is entered
into. The statute literally says only that "such agreement shall not
derogate from the rights of creditors."' Therefore, if creditors existing
at the time of the agreement would have been entitled to reach the
community property in the absence of the agreement, then the statute
precludes a couple from making the creditors worse off by entering
into a community property agreement.65 On the other hand, if the
61. Id. § 26.16.120 (1989).
62. Id.
63. Brachtenbach, Community Property Agreements-Many Questions, Few Answers, 37
WASH. L. REv. 469, 471 (1962).
64. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.120 (1989) (emphasis added).
65. Washington law seems clear that the rights of creditors existing at the time the spouses
enter into an agreement to convert separate property to community property or vice versa cannot
be prejudiced by such an agreement. Fisher v. Marsh, 69 Wash. 570, 125 P. 951 (1912); see
Lanigan v. Miles, 102 Wash. 82, 172 P. 894 (1918). This is made clear by statute as to
community real property converted to separate. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.050 (1989); see
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obligation is one incurred after execution of the community property
agreement, the mere fact that the effect of the disposition at death por-
tion of the agreement is to leave that much less property available" at
the death of the spouse does not necessarily "derogate" from the rights
of such creditors. On this theory, the post-agreement creditor takes
the debtor spouse as he finds him: with sheltered assets. 66" This inter-
pretation, it should be noted, is consistent with the treatment of the
community property agreement as a: true contract, bargained for
between the spouses. At the time the agreement is entered into, each
spouse releases his or her right to dispose of half of the community in
some other way if he or she dies first, in return for a comparable
release by the other spouse.
There are several reasons, however, why this narrow interpretation
of the statute should be rejected. First, it fails to take account of the
fact that a community property agreement is not an agreement entered
into with a disinterested third party. Both parties to a community
property agreement have an interest in avoiding their mutual credi-
tors. In the absence of such an agreement, community creditors
would be entitled to reach all the community at the death of one
spouse, and separate creditors would be entitled to reach the dece-
dent's half of the community without regard to when during the mar-
riage their claims arose. Allowing spouses to shelter their assets from
subsequent creditors by use of such an agreement-even if not in
Cross, supra note 17, at 101, 107. Smyser v. Smyser, 17 Wash. 2d 301, 135 P.2d 455 (1943),
which might -at first seem to the contrary, can be reconciled. There, the separate creditor (ex-
wife) of the remarried spouse was precluded from reaching her ex-husband's separate property
after he had converted it to community property upon remarriage. Id. at 308, 135 P.2d at 458.
But the ex-wife did not directly seek to attack the community property agreement entered into by
the husband on remarriage. Id. at 306, 135 P.2d at 458. Her loss in the case was a matter of
pleading rather than a matter of substantive rights. Moreover, the court left open the possibility
that the ex-wife might reach some of the property that had been converted to the community
property of the new marriage if she recast her complaint. 17 Wash. 2d at 309, 135 P.2d at 459.
66. This interpretation is analogous to what has been done with regard to spouses' separate
debts. Washington generally protects community property from the separate contractual
liabilities of either spouse. But this works a potential hardship for creditors who extended credit
to a person before marriage. A debt-encumbered person with only earning potential might avoid
such creditors by getting married and converting his earnings to community property. To avoid
this problem of "marital bankruptcy," Washington subjects (at least to a limited extent) the
debtor spouse's marital "earnings and accumulations" to his separate prenuptial liabilities.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.200 (1989). But post-marital separate contract creditors must take
the spouse as they find him. They may not reach the community property to satisfy their separate
claims, even if the property was converted from separate to community property after marriage,
but before the claim arose. Nichols Hill Bank v. McCool, 104 Wash. 2d 78, 85-87, 701 P.2d 114,
117-119 (1985); Colorado National Bank v. Merlino, 35 Wash. App. 610, 668 P.2d 1304 (1983).
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actual fraud of existing creditors 67-therefore invites abuse. Second,
allowing a community property agreement to preclude post-agreement
creditors on the theory that such creditors take debtors as they find
them fails to do justice to involuntary creditors, such as tort victims.
Finally, if such a narrow construction of the statute were allowed, it
might make the quasi-testamentary feature of community property
agreements a fraud on community creditors. In a very important
sense, a spouse who enters into such an agreement does not part with
most of her beneficial interest in the property until she dies, and even
then, only if she dies first. The community property covered by the
agreement remains fully available to the spouses for their use and
enjoyment (and for their community creditors' claims) while both
spouses are alive. If the operation of the survivorship feature of the
agreement is interpreted so as to permit the couple to avoid their com-
munity creditors upon the death of the first spouse, then the couple
has worked a fraud on the creditors.68
For these reasons, it seems to me that a broader interpretation of the
statute is preferable. Since the main purpose of the statute seems to
have been to provide a nonprobate method for disposing of commu-
nity property at death, the proviso should be interpreted to preserve
whatever rights creditors would have had against community property
at the death of one spouse in the absence of the statute. 69 Amendment
of the proviso itself would ensure such an interpretation, and such an
67. For purposes of the fraudulent transfers act. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.40.061 (1989), the
transfer involved when a community property agreement is executed would presumably take
place upon recording the agreement (where it involves realty) or upon execution of the agreement
(where recording is not possible). See supra text accompanying notes 32-40.
68. See discussion of the UFTA, supra text accompanying notes 27-42. Despite the intuitive
force of the argument that this would constitute a fraud on community creditors, it would be
difficult to establish that the survivorship feature of the agreement has worked a fraudulent
transfer under the UFTA. It will be recalled that to establish a fraudulent transfer under that
Act, absent actual fraudulent intent, it is necessary to show both that there was a "transfer" that
left the transferor insolvent, and that the transferor did not receive "reasonably equivalent value"
in return for the interest transferred. Even if we could establish that a decedent spouse with a
community property agreement has retained a valuable property interest in his share of the
community property which is not "transferred" until death, it will be difficult to show that this
was a gratuitous transfer given its contractual nature. The decedent spouse who agrees to
transfer his share of the community to a surviving spouse under such an agreement usually has
received "reasonably equivalent value" for that transfer at the time the agreement was executed.
He has received the other spouse's binding promise to leave her half of the community to him if
he survives. The existence of this exchanged value would ordinarily defeat any fraudulent
transfer argument. In a few cases, however, there may have been no such reciprocal promise by
the surviving spouse. In such cases, creditors could argue that the transfer to the surviving
spouse would be fraudulent under the UFTA, and should be set aside by creditors.
69. See Aronson v. Murk, 67 Wash. 2d 1, 9-11, 406 P.2d 607, 612-13 (1965) (dictum
suggesting that community creditors would be entitled to reach community property that passes
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amendment is proposed in the Appendix.7" A further proposal that
would establish a procedure for reaching such nonprobate transfers is
discussed in Section V below.
Until such an amendment is adopted, it appears that creditors will
need to file suit against those to whom the community property passed
outside of probate on the basis of the existing proviso that community
property agreements are not permitted to derogate from the rights of
creditors.
B. Joint Property
Although joint tenancy with right of survivorship 7 was abolished in
Washington by statute in 1885, it was reinstituted in 1961 by a Popu-
lar Initiative.72
[T]here shall be a form of co-ownership of property, real and personal,
known as joint tenancy. A joint tenancy shall have the incidents of sur-
vivorship and severability as at common law. Joint tenancy shall be
created only by written instrument, which instrument shall expressly
73declare the interest created to be a joint tenancy....
At common law, a person contributing property to a joint tenancy
gives up a half interest in the property contributed; the non-contribut-
ing party receives a half interest. But after the joint tenancy is estab-
lished, each joint tenant possesses (during the lives of both tenants) an
undivided half interest in the whole and the right to sever the joint
tenancy by conveyance,74 encumbrance,75 or action for partition.76
This right to enjoyment and to partition is lost only by the first to die,
and not until death.
to a surviving spouse under a community property agreement); see also Brachtenbach, supra note
63, at 474.
70. See infra Appendix, Section II.
71. This section deals with joint tenancies as authorized by WASH. REV. CODE § 64.28.010
(1989). It does not deal with joint bank accounts, as authorized by § 30.22. Multi-party bank
accounts are dealt with in the next section.
72. Initiative No. 208, codified as WASH. REV. CODE § 64.28.
73. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.28.010 (1989).
74. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK, D. WHrrMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.4 (1984)
[hereinafter CUNNINGHAM].
75. Ia at 209. But see Treadwell & Shulkin, Joint Tenancy-Creditor-Debtor Relations, 37
WAsH. L. REv. 58, 59-62 (1962) (suggesting that if one joint tenant gives a mortgage interest in
joint property, it maynot cause a severance in Washington). Even if the joint tenancy is not
severed automatically by an encumbrance, however, the joint tenant may institute an action for
partition, and execution against the joint tenancy property would cause a severance.
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 74, at 210.
76. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 74, at 231-39.
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As with the community property agreement statute, the joint ten-
ancy statute has this, and only this, to say about creditors: "Provided,
That such transfer shall not derogate from the rights of creditors.
7
This language also seems susceptible to both a narrow and a broad
interpretation. At a minimum, it must protect the rights of creditors
existing at the time the initial transfer into joint tenancy was made.
Suppose that the owner of property retitles it as joint property with
another. At common law, the owner has made a gift of a half interest
in the property to the other joint tenant. If, at the time of the convey-
ance into joint tenancy, the contributing joint tenant was in debt, the
existing creditors may be entitled to set the conveyance aside as a
fraud on their rights.7 8 Provided that the conveyance to the other was
not in fraud of existing creditors, however, an existing (or subsequent)
creditor would thereafter only be able to reach the debtor joint ten-
ant's proportionate interest in the joint tenancy property. The proviso
must, at least, be intended to preserve these existing rights.
Possibly the statute was intended to provide greater protection to
the existing creditors of the joint tenant who contributed the property.
It might mean, for example, that existing creditors could ignore the
initial creation of the joint tenancy by the debtor and treat the whole
of the joint property as that of the debtor regardless of whether the
initial transfer into joint tenancy can be shown to be in fraud of
creditors.79
The more difficult question is whether the proviso was intended to
affect creditors' rights upon the death of a debtor joint tenant. At
common law, a creditor's rights to a debtor's joint property were lim-
ited to the right to sever before the debtor joint tenant died.8" The
creditor could then reach the debtor co-tenant's proportionate interest.
If the debtor owning an interest in joint tenancy died before the credi-
tor sought to reach the debtor's share, however, his interest was
deemed to expire and the survivor held free of any claims against the
77. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.28.010 (1989).
78. See discussion of the UFTA, supra notes 27-42 and accompanying text; see also In re
Granwell, 20 N.Y.2d 91, 228 N.E.2d 779, 281 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1967) (son by first marriage
allowed to reach 1/2 of assets put into joint tenancy with subsequent spouse on theory of
fraudulent conveyance). d
79. See Cross, Joint Tenancy for Washington, 35 WASH. L. REV. 292, 299-300 (1960)
[hereinafter Joint Tenancy]; Treadwell & Shulkin, supra note 75, at 59.
80. Joint Tenancy, supra note 79, at 299; Treadwell & Shulkin, supra note 75, at 63-65; see
also WASH. REV. CODE § 6.17.170 (1989).
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decedent.8" This is still the prevailing rule. It is possible that the pro-
viso was intended to change this common law result so as to make
joint property in the hands of the surviving joint tenant available to
satisfy claims against the deceased joint tenant, at least to the extent of
the decedent's contributions to the joint property.
Insofar as the statute provides any guidance, however, it suggests
that this was not the intent behind the proviso. The statute provides
that joint tenancies shall have "the incidents of survivorship and
severability as at common law."'82 Moreover, the proviso preserves
creditors' rights only as to "transfers," and a joint tenancy was not
viewed as constituting a "transfer" at death at common law. 83
The Washington Supreme Court has not expressly addressed the
scope of creditors' rights under the proviso, but several decisions pro-
vide some support for the conclusion that survivorship property can-
not be reached to satisfy the decedent joint tenant's debts.84 In
Anderson v. Anderson,8" although there was apparently enough pro-
bate property to pay all the decedent's debts, the executor sought to
subject joint bank account assets to a proportionate share of the debts
of the first joint tenant to die on the theory that the deceased joint
tenant had intended this. The trial court held that the surviving joint
tenant (decedent's spouse) had no obligation to pay part of the debts of
the estate out of the joint property. On appeal, the supreme court
affirmed this result, finding that the decedent's spouse had acquired a
vested survivorship right in the account when the account was created
and the decedent was deemed to have known this.
In Estate of Baxter,86 the court affirmed a trial court's conclusion
that cash in a joint bank account with right of survivorship is "owned
by the surviving joint owner and is not an asset of the estate available
81. 4A R.POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 617 (rev. ed. 1982); Joint Tenancy, supra
note 79, at 299.
82. WASH. REv. CODE § 64.28.010 (1989) (emphasis added).
83. Joint Tenancy, supra note 79, at 299. But see supra text accompanying notes 98-104
suggesting that joint tenancy may constitute a "transfer" at death for purposes of the UFTA.
84. All the cases in Washington have involved joint bank accounts, which differ from
traditional joint tenancies in that they are usually viewed as revocable by the depositor up until
death. But if creditors of a deceased joint depositor are barred from reaching funds in such an
account, even though the account was revocable until death, it should follow a fortiori that
creditors of a deceased joint tenant of a traditional joint tenancy would be barred.
85. 80 Wash. 2d 496, 495 P.2d 1037 (1972).
86. 68 Wash. 2d 294, 296, 412 P.2d 777 (1966).
Washington Law Review
for the payment of creditors claims in this estate.",8 7 In In re Peter-
son's Estate, " the state inheritance tax division sought to subject prop-
erty in a joint survivorship account to tax at the death of one joint
tenant.89 At the time, the tax statute reached only nonprobate prop-
erty which passed "by deed, grant, sale or gift made in contemplation
of death ... or intended to take effect in possession after the death of
the donor." The court held that the property was not subject to the tax
since a surviving joint tenant "succeeds to no new title or right upon
the death of his co-tenant, but is merely relieved thereby from the fur-
ther interference of the co-tenant." 90
These decisions are generally in accord with those from other juris-
dictions.91 There has, however, been a widespread statutory modifica-
tion of the common law rule for purposes of death taxes. For
example, joint property held with someone other than a spouse is part
of the decedent joint tenant's gross estate to the extent of the dece-
dent's contributions and is subject to federal estate tax. 92 But the fact
that these changes occurred by express statutory modification con-
firms that a different rule exists at common law. Outside of the tax
area, there is little evidence of any general movement to subject survi-
vorship property to the debts of decedents.93
In view of the well-established law that creditors' rights against joint
property are extinguished at the death of the debtor joint tenant, if it is
the legislature's intent to subject survivorship property to the claims of
a decedent joint tenant's creditors, the legislature should make this
87. The probate estate was insufficient (after an award in lieu of homestead) to satisfy the
creditor's claim, but the joint bank account assets had been listed on the inventory for inheritance
tax purposes and had been relied upon by the executrix to obtain an order of solvency so she
could proceed by non-intervention proceeding. The creditor argued that the inclusion of the
nonprobate assets in the probate inventory had prejudiced his rights, but did not raise any
argument under section 64.28.010. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's judgment that
the joint property was not available to satisfy the creditor without discussion of section
64.28.010.
88. 182 Wash. 29, 45 P.2d 45 (1935)
89. Id. at 35, 45 P.2d at 46.
90. 182 Wash. at 36, 45 P.2d at 49; see also Nelson v. Olympia Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n,
193 Wash. 222, 227, 74 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1938) (statute later amended to cover joint property).
91. The general rule elsewhere is that joint property is not subject to the debts of the decedent
joint tenant. E.g., Schmidt v. Schmidt, 254 N.W.2d 102 (N.D. 1977); DeForge v. Patrick, 162
Neb. 568, 76 N.W.2d 733 (1956). See generally Effland, supra note 9, at 435-38.
92. I.R.C. 2040 (West 1989); see also Nelson v. Olympia Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 193 Wash.
222, 227-28, 74 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1938) (Washington inheritance tax statute covers joint
property).
93. "Only one state [Nebraska] has ever enacted legislation to allow creditors of a deceased
joint tenant to proceed against the surviving tenant, and that state has repealed its legislation."
Effland, supra note 9, at 437 & n.31.
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clear. The existing proviso simply is not enough, because the proviso
does not make clear what creditors' rights the legislature thought it
was protecting.94
Regardless of the legislature's intent in 1961, however, there is no
obvious reason why the joint tenancy form should be allowed to defeat
otherwise valid and enforceable claims against one of the joint tenants.
That it does so seems more a result of historical accident than reason.
To allow it to continue to do so may work a positive injustice to many
creditors. The arguments that are usually made to preclude creditors
from reaching certain kinds of property simply do not apply here.
Although a person who voluntarily extends credit with the knowledge
that the debtor's property is held in joint tenancy may justifiably be
cut off if he understands that his rights against such property are cut
off if the debtor dies first, the statute is sufficiently unclear to raise
serious question as to whether it provides fair notice of this conse-
quence. More importantly, not all creditors (tort victims, for exam-
ple) have voluntarily entered into the role of creditor, so the question
of notice does not even arise. Finally, debtors may retitle property in
joint tenancy form after incurring debts without the knowledge of the
creditor. Some of these transfers may be voidable by the creditor as
fraudulent transfers, but it is unlikely that they all would be. 95 The
legislature therefore should clarify the statute to provide that property
which passes to a surviving joint tenant by reason of one joint tenant's
death should be subject to the claims against the decedent joint tenant.
This is not to say that all of the joint tenant's contributions to the
joint tenancy should be available to his creditors at death. Insofar as
the contributing joint tenant has surrendered rights in the contributed
property by transfer into the joint tenancy form, this transfer should
be tested under conventional principles that would apply to any inter
vivos transfer. Was the transfer fraudulent as to creditors at the time
of transfer? If not, creditors have no cause to complain about the
transfer of those rights. If the contributing joint tenant dies first, his
94. If, as seems likely under the language discussed so far, joint property in the hands of a
survivor will generally be exempt from the claims of the decedent joint tenant's creditors, what
are we to conclude with regard to the recent changes made with respect to spousal joint
tenancies, which raise a presumption that such tenancies are community property in a
survivorship form? WASH. REv. CODE § 64.28.040 (1989). There is no reason to suppose such
spousal joint tenancies would be treated differently than other kinds of joint property as far as
creditors are concerned. But this would be anomalous if property passing under a community
property agreement would be subjected to creditors' claims under WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.16.120 (1989); see supra Section III.A. Such spousal joint tenancies are virtually
indistinguishable in form from a survivorship community property agreement.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 27-42.
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creditors should be entitled to reach only that tenant's proportionate
share in the property, just as they could have done up until the
moment of his death. 96 The converse, of course, is also true: insofar as
a noncontributing joint tenant has obtained valuable rights to property
by virtue of someone else's transfer, the creditors of the recipient joint
tenant should be entitled to reach that tenant's proportionate share in
the property if that tenant dies first, just as they could have reached it
up until the moment of death. A suggested amendment of the proviso
is included in the Appendix.9 7 A further proposal that would establish
a procedure for handling creditors' claims against such property is dis-
cussed in Section V below.
If a change of this sort is not made, the UFTA may provide an
alternative basis for subjecting joint tenancy property to the claims of
the creditors of a deceased joint tenant. As explained above,98 when
the joint tenancy is first established, the person contributing the prop-
erty transfers an undivided half interest in the property to the other
joint tenant, along with a survivorship right. But the contributor also
retains an undivided half interest, together with a right to sever. The
other joint tenant receives similar rights. As a result, if a creditor of
one joint tenant obtains a judgment against the tenant while still alive,
the creditor can execute against the joint property to the extent of the
debtor tenant's proportionate share.99 Therefore, under the UFTA, it
can be argued that the beneficial interest possessed by each joint tenant
is not "transferred" until death."°  If that transfer-by means of the
survivorship feature-leaves the estate of the first to die insolvent, and
if the decedent joint tenant did not receive "reasonably equivalent
value" in return for the survivorship right originally given, °1 then it
96. The contrast between this proposal and the treatment under the I.R.C is noteworthy. The
tax code subjects joint property to the transfer tax to the extent of the decedent's contributions.
I.R.C. § 2040(a) (West 1989). But, as explained in the text, protection of general creditors at
death does not seem to require reference to the decedent's contributions.
97. See infra Appendix, Section III.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
99. Treadwell & Shulkin, supra note 75, at 64-66.
100. WASH REV. CODE § 19.40.011(12) (1989).
101. Where the property titled in joint form is community property, then the survivor may
well be able to defeat a fraudulent transfer claim on the theory that "reasonably equivalent
value" was given, in the form of a binding survivorship right given to the other spouse. See
discussion of community property agreements, supra note 68 and accompanying text.
Frequently, however, community property will not be involved and one person will have
contributed all, or a disproportionate share of the property that is titled jointly. In those
situations, creditors may be able to show that there was no "reasonably equivalent value"
received in return for the survivorship right given to the survivor.
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should be possible for the creditors of that deceased joint tenant to set
aside the testamentary "transfer" as fraudulent.
This reading of the UFTA is, of course, at odds with the common
law view of joint tenancies, summarized above, because at common
law, no "transfer" occurred at the death of the first joint tenant. But
the definition of "transfer" in the UFTA, which depends upon the
"disposition of" or "parting with" a beneficial interest, 102 can be read
as changing the common law of joint tenancies.
Whether the UFTA would require the creditor to file a claim in a
probate proceeding is less clear. Ordinarily the creditor would need to
do this to establish that the decedent was left "insolvent" as a result of
the transfer."0 3 Even if no probate proceeding had been opened, the
creditor is entitled to appointment as PR and could establish insol-
vency in that way."° But if there is no probate property, this exercise
seems somewhat pointless. If the creditor can show that there is no
probate property, then this should establish insolvency without the
need for a probate and the creditor should be able to proceed directly
to set aside nonprobate fraudulent transfers.105
C. Multi-Party Bank Accounts
Closely related to joint tenancies as authorized by Title 64 are joint
bank accounts 11 6 authorized by The Financial Institution Individual
Account Deposit Act (FIIADA), enacted in 1982.107 Joint bank
accounts are the most familiar of the multi-party bank accounts that
can serve as will substitutes. The statute also authorizes trust
accounts and payable on death (POD) accounts." 8 Moreover, two
kinds of joint bank accounts are authorized, one carrying the survivor-
ship feature, the other not carrying it. 10 9 Joint bank accounts without
the right of survivorship are really a form of tenancy in common and
will not function as a will substitute. But the statute makes clear that
the three other types of multi-party accounts may be used to avoid
probate:
102. See supra text accompanying notes 27-35.
103. WAsH. REv. CODE § 19.40.051 (1989).
104. Id. §§ 11.28.010-.120.
105. Under WASH. REV. CODE § 19.40.071(a)(1) (1989), a creditor will be entitled to set
aside a fraudulent transfer to the extent necessary to satisfy his or her claim.
106. See generally McGovern, supra note 9.
107. WASH. REv. CODE § 30.22 (1989).
108. Id. § 30.22.050(5).
109. Id. § 30.22.050(2), (3).
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Any transfers to surviving depositors or to trust or P.O.D. account ben-
eficiaries pursuant to the terms of this section are declared to be effective
by reason of the provisions of the account contracts involved and this
chapter and are not to be considered as testamentary dispositions. The
rights of survivorship and of trust and P.O.D. account beneficiaries arise
from the express terms of the contract of deposit and cannot, under any
circumstances, be changed by the will of a depositor. 110
Unlike a traditional joint tenancy, a multi-party bank account is
presumed to be revocable by the depositor up until death. 11' Each
depositor effectively retains ownership of his or her contributions to
the account." 2 At the death of a depositor, subject to community
property rights, "[f]unds belonging to a deceased depositor which
remain on deposit in a joint account with right of survivorship belong
to the surviving depositors unless there is clear and convincing evi-
dence of a contrary intent at the time the account was created.""' 3
Funds on deposit in a trust or POD account belong to the beneficiary
designated by the deceased depositor." 4
What is the consequence for creditors of a deceased depositor of this
statutory scheme? The statute says only that
the provisions [relating to ownership of funds] are relevant only as to
controversies between [depositors and account beneficiaries] and their
creditors, and other successors, and have no bearing on the power of any
person to receive payment of funds.., or the right of a financial institu-
tion to make payments to any person as provided by the terms of the
contract of deposit. 15
Insofar as anything can be inferred from this passing reference to cred-
itors, it seems to support a weak inference that creditors' claims are
barred. In the ordinary case, if a depositor to a joint, trust, or POD
account has died, none of the funds remaining on deposit "belong" to
110. Id. § 30.22.100(5) (emphasis added).
I 11. See Morse v. Williams, 48 Wash. App. 734, 740 P.2d 884 (1987).
112. "Funds on deposit in a trust or P.O.D. account belong to the depositor and not to the
trust or P.O.D. account beneficiary." WASH. REV. CODE § 30.22.090(3). Funds on deposit in a
joint account during the lives of the depositors belong to the depositors "in proportion to the net
funds owned by each depositor on deposit in the account." Id. § 30.22.090(2). It is important to
be able to document who made each withdrawal, and whose funds were withdrawn. Suppose that
A deposits $10,000 and B deposits $5,000 to a joint account. Then they withdraw $5,000 for a
joint project. Who owns the balance? Presumably, each withdrew $2,500 of "their" funds on
deposit, provided the project is truly a 50/50 joint project. If so, A owns $7,500 and B owns
$2,500 of the remainder.
113. Id. § 30.22.100(3).
114. Id. § 30.22.100(4) (there is a minor exception to this rule if the account has been
designated as a joint account with right of survivorship).
115. Id. § 30.22.110 (emphasis added).
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him or her any longer.'16 So the statute could be interpreted to mean
that the decedent's creditors have no rights against the remaining
funds. 11
7
Nonetheless, the statute hardly can be said to address the rights of
creditors directly. Moreover, there is reason for questioning any inter-
pretation that would cut off creditors of a deceased depositor. On the
issue of trusts or POD accounts, there seems to be no case law in
Washington as to the availability of the proceeds of these accounts to
meet the claims of the decedent depositor's creditors."' In other juris-
dictions, however, tentative or "Totten" trust bank accounts, from
which our trust or POD accounts are functionally indistinguishable,
have generally been found subject to deceased depositors' creditors.1 19
On the issue of joint bank accounts, although what little case law there
is in Washington suggests that creditors' claims against these accounts
would be barred upon the death of a depositor, all of this case law
predates the FIIADA.12°
The FIIADA offers a "fresh start" to the interpretation of the
depositors' rights to multi-party bank accounts. As the Washington
116. The provision governing joint accounts with right of survivorship may affect creditors of
the first to die in another respect, since it would allow creditors to show by "clear and convincing
evidence" that survivorship was not intended. Id. § 30.22.100(3); see Estate of Randmel v.
Pounds, 38 Wash. App. 401, 685 P.2d 638 (1984); Tripp v. Scott, 29 Wash. App. 869, 631 P.2d
973 (1981)(prior law); cf Yakima Adjustment Serv. Inc. v. Durand, 28 Wash. App 180, 622
P.2d 408 (1981) (creditor of one joint tenant in survivorship bank account could not reach
account funds where other joint tenant intervened and showed he had contributed all the funds
and that it was an account for his convenience). If the showing that survivorship was not
intended can be made, the funds would be probate property and available to creditors through
the probate process.
117. The statute does authorize banks to pay funds remaining on deposit directly to creditors
of a deceased depositor if the account balance is no more than $2,500 and no PR has been
appointed, but only if the funds would be probate property of the decedent had a PR been
appointed. WASH. REv. CODE § 30.22.190(2) (1989).
118. But see Decker v. Fowler, 199 Wash. 549, 92 P.2d 254 (1939), involving United States
Savings Bonds with POD designation. The court held that such bonds must be turned over to
estate of deceased purchaser on the theory that purchaser had not surrendered dominion or
control over the bonds prior to death. The case is discussed infra text accompanying notes
220-22.
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58, comment d (1959); 4 A. ScoTr & W.
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 330.12, at 377-78 (4th ed. 1989); Cohen, The Rights of the
Surviving Spouse and Creditors in the Proceeds of Savings Account Trusts, 50 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
159 (1973); Effland, supra note 9, at 445; McGovern, supra note 9, at 27. The rationale of the
recent cases subjecting non-bank account revocable trusts to claims of creditors, discussed infra
text accompanying notes 211-223, also would apply to trust or POD accounts as the accounts
are revocable by the depositor.
120. See Anderson v. Anderson, 80 Wash. 2d 496, 495 P.2d 1037 (1972); In re Estate of
Baxter, 68 Wash. 2d 294, 412 P.2d 777 (1966); In re Estate of Peterson, 182 Wash 29, 45 P.2d 45
(1935), discussed supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
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court of appeals recognized recently when examining the FIIADA in
another context, in adopting the FIIADA the legislature did not
intend to characterize multi-party accounts as "nontestamentary" for
all purposes, but only for the purpose of exempting them from the
normal requirements for the execution of a valid will. 21 Since such
accounts are fully revocable during the life of the depositor and "do
not give a nondepositing party any present interest in the account
funds" until the death of the depositor, it is inappropriate to attach to
them the legal consequences that would attach at common law to a
true joint tenancy or irrevocable trust.122 In particular, it is inappro-
priate to deprive creditors of any opportunity to reach funds contrib-
uted by a deceased depositor simply because the depositor sought to
avoid the delay and expense of probate as to these funds. Funds
deposited in such accounts should be fully available to the creditors of
the decedent depositor just as if they were disposed of under a will,
even though the formal requirements for executing a will do not
apply. 123
The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) makes this result explicit. 124 It
has expressly made amounts held in multi-party bank accounts avail-
able to satisfy claims of general creditors (and claims of the surviving
121. Morse v. Williams, 48 Wash. App. 734, 739, 740 P.2d 884, 888 (1987).
122. Id. at 740-41, 740 P.2d at 888. Further support for this conclusion is given by the
decision in In re Estate of Button, 79 Wash. 2d 849, 490 P.2d 731 (1971), in which the court
applied the anti-lapse statute to a gift under a revocable inter vivos trust that was supposed to
take effect on the death of the settlor. "A gift to be enjoyed only upon or after the death of the
donor is in practical effect a legacy, whether it is created in an inter vivos instrument or in a
will." Id. at 854, 490 P.2d at 734.
123. Fletcher, supra note 9, at 295.
124. U.P.C. § 6-215 (1989). In August 1989, former section 6-107 of the UPC was recast and
redesignated as section 6-215. 1989 Amendments to U.P.C., supra note 4. The only substantive
change made was that creditors' claims must now be made within one year. In Morse v.
Williams, 48 Wash. App. at 739, 740 P.2d at 882-88, the court of appeals relied heavily on the
legislative history of the UPC to interpret analogous provisions of the FIIADA. The creditors'
rights provision of the UPC may, therefore, be influential if the court is asked to determine if
creditors can reach such accounts under our Act. But this cuts two ways. On the one hand, the
UPC provision represents a considered approach to the problem. On the other, the drafters of
the FIIADA were presumably aware of the UPC provision and did not include an analogous one
in the FIIADA. There is no official legislative history for the FIIADA, but it appears that the
creditors' claim provision found in U.P.C. § 6-107 (now § 6-215) was not proposed to, or
considered by, the legislature in 1982. It is therefore difficult to attach much significance to this
omission. U.P.C. § 6-107 was proposed to the Washington legislature in 1971, however, as part
of a comprehensive bill that would have enacted the UPC as a whole. S. 313, 42d Reg. Sess.,
§ 1 IA.6-107 (1971) (on file with Washington Law Review) [hereinafter S. 313]; see also infra
note 229. See generally Fletcher, supra note 9, at 261 n.3. The comprehensive bill was never
enacted, but it is unlikely that the creditors' claim provision was a reason for its defeat.
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spouse and minor children) "if other assets of the estate are insuffi-
cient."' 25 Under the UPC, the proceeds from such an account are
paid to the surviving joint tenant, or to the POD beneficiary, who is
then liable to account to the decedent's PR for amounts owned benefi-
cially by the decedent immediately before death to the extent neces-
sary to discharge claims against the decedent's estate. Section 6-227 of
the UPC also gives banks holding such multiple-party accounts a right
to set-off against amounts due a survivor or POD beneficiary any
amount owed the bank by the decedent depositor.'26 The principal
shortcoming of the UPC scheme is that it fails to provide for the settle-
ment of claims without the appointment of a PR. A proposed statute
modelled on the UPC scheme, but allowing for the amicable settle-
ment of claims without appointment of a PR, is contained in the
Appendix. 27 It is discussed further in Section V below.
The UFTA again may provide an alternative route for arriving at
the same conclusion. During the depositor's life, the FIIADA pro-
vides that the depositor owns the funds in the account in proportion to
his or her net contributions. 2 ' Ordinarily, therefore, a depositor to
such an account has not "parted with" any interest in his or her depos-
its until the depositor dies.' 29 Since a "transfer" does not take place
under the UFTA until the owner "disposes of" or "parts with" a ben-
eficial interest, 30 it appears that a transfer of an interest in a multi-
party bank account set up under the FIIADA does not take place until
the depositor dies. If that transfer at death leaves the depositor's
estate insolvent, and again, if no "reasonably equivalent value" was
125. If other assets of the estate are insufficient, a transfer resulting from a right of
survivorship or POD designated under this part is not effective against the estate of a deceased
party to the extent needed to pay debts and expenses of administration, including statutory
allowances to the surviving spouse, minor children and dependent children, if other assets of the
estate are insufficient. U.P.C. § 6-215 (1989).
126. 1989 Amendments to the U.P.C., supra note 4. Section 6-227 was formerly designated
section 6-272.
127. See infra Appendix, Section V.
128. WASH. REV. CODE § 30.22.090(2),(3).
129. Morse v. Williams, 48 Wash. App. 734, 741, 740 P.2d 884, 888 (1987). Where the
account in question is a joint account, the statement in the text is something of an
oversimplification. The nondepositing tenant may withdraw funds from the account. If that is
done without the permission of the depositing joint tenant, the depositor apparently has a right to
be reimbursed by the withdrawing party, even though the bank is protected from liability. WASH.
REv. CODE §§ 30.22.090(2), 30.22.120-.130 (1989). If the withdrawal is done with the
permission of the depositor, then a "transfer" has been made to the withdrawing party at that
time. In that event, of course, the amounts withdrawn will no longer be in the account and will
be unavailable to creditors of the depositor for that reason (unless the gift was fraudulent at the
time the withdrawal was made).
130. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.40.011(13) (1989).
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received in return for the at death "transfer," then it should be possi-
ble for the creditors of the depositor to set it aside as fraudulent. 131
D. United States Savings Bonds
Closely related to multi-party bank accounts are United States Sav-
ings Bonds held either in POD form or in co-owner form with right of
survivorship. '32 The federal regulations provide that during the life of
the owner(s), the bond is redeemable by the registered owner(s) upon
surrender. 133 At the death of a co-owner, however, "the surviving co-
owner will be recognized as [the bond's] sole and absolute owner," and
at the death of a POD bond registered owner, "the beneficiary will be
recognized as the sole and absolute owner of the bond."' 134
It is clear that these regulations preempt inconsistent state laws, so
that Washington cannot deny effect to the survivorship or POD
designation made by the purchaser.1 35 But it does not follow that sub-
jecting the proceeds of bonds to the decedent purchaser's debts would
be inconsistent with the federal regulations. In Yiatchos v. Yiatchos,
the United States Supreme Court held, despite Washington state law
to the contrary, that a spouse was entitled unilaterally to designate
someone other that his surviving spouse to receive his half interest in
U.S. Bonds purchased with community funds.136 But it qualified this
holding by reciting its understanding that a decedent spouse's interest
in the community property was chargeable with his separate debts
and with one-half the community debts. It then went on to state that:
131. Id. § 19.40.071.
132. 31 C.F.R. § 315.7 (1985).
133. If the bond is in co-owner form, either co-owner may redeem it. Id. § 315.37. If the
bond is in POD form, it is redeemable only by the registered owner while he/she is alive. Id.
§ 315.38.
134. Id. § 315.70(b)(1),(c) (1988).
135. Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
136. 376 U.S. 306 (1964). A spouse had purchased United States Bonds with community
property and made them payable to his brother. The purchaser then died, and his spouse sought
to enforce her community property rights as to half of the bonds, and to include her husband's
half in his probate estate. The Washington Supreme Court held that purchase of the bonds was
void because beyond the decedent's authority, and held that the wife had a vested interest in 1/2
of the proceeds, and decedent's half was to be distributed under his will. The United States
Supreme Court reversed as to the decedent's half of the community, holding that this was
decedent's property which he was entitled to invest in the bonds. Washington could not order
that this be turned over to his estate. The court remanded as to the wife's half for a determination
of whether the wife had consented to the use of her community share for purchase of the bonds
and therefore had given away a share of her community property. If not, use of her share of the
community to purchase the bonds was fraudulent as to her and the POD designation as to her 1/
2 need not be given effect.
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It would not contravene federal law as expressed in the applicable regu-
lations to require the bonds to bear the same share of the debts that they
would have borne if they had been passed to petitioner [brother] as a
specific legacy under the will rather than by the survivorship provisions
of the bonds.
The judgment of the Washington court is reversed insofar as it relates
to one-half of the bonds, subject to the above remarks concerning the
portion of the debts which may be allocable thereto. 13 7
Apparently, then, it would not violate the Supremacy Clause for
Washington to hold that the proceeds of co-owner bonds or POD
bonds are subject to a decedent purchaser's debts.
No Washington decisions since Yiatchos have addressed the liability
of United States co-owner or POD bonds for the purchaser's debts.
The prevailing rule in other jurisdictions, at least prior to Yiatchos,
had been that the proceeds of such bonds are not subject to the dece-
dent purchaser's debts. 138 These cases, however, should be rejected on
the basis of Yiatchos on the ground that they erroneously assume it
would be inconsistent with federal law to subject bond proceeds to the
debts of the decedent purchaser. There is no reason, therefore, not to
subject the proceeds of savings bonds to the debts of a deceased pur-
chaser unless and until federal law prohibits the state from doing so. 139
As a matter of state law, creditors should have the same rights to
reach such assets as they have against multi-party bank account funds
because the nonprobate designation on such bonds is fully revocable
by the purchaser until his or her death.
E. Life Insurance
Life insurance, of course, is one of the most common and popular
kinds of will substitute. In general, so long as the owner of the policy
designates a beneficiary other than himself in the manner required by
the insurance company, and the beneficiary survives the insured, the
proceeds will be paid to the named beneficiary without regard to the
probate of the insured's estate.
137. Id. at 313.
138. In re Briley's Estate, 155 Fla. 748, 21 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1945); Reynolds v. Danko, 134
N.J. Eq. 560, 36 A.2d 420 (1944); Application of Laundree, 277 A.2d 994, 100 N.Y.S.2d 145
(1950) (proceeds of POD bonds not available to pay decedent's liability for state cost of care),
revyg 195 Misc. 754, 91 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1949).
139. Cf Decker v. Fowler, 199 Wash. 549, 554, 92 P.2d 254, 256-57 (1939) (Beals, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that the rights of a POD beneficiary should not be superior to the
purchaser's creditors).
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This is one area in which the rights of creditors are fairly well
defined. Both the policy and the proceeds of life insurance are gener-
ally exempt from the claims of the owner's creditors. " The exemp-
tion applies to group policies as well as individual policies.141
In Washington there are four important exceptions, and one impor-
tant caveat, to this broad exemption of life insurance. First, the
exemption does not extend to the owner's federal gift and estate tax
liability.142 Second, the exemption does not apply to the proceeds of
individual life insurance where the proceeds are deliberately made
payable primarily to the insured or to the estate of the insured. 14 3
(The proceeds of group life policies, however, appear to be exempt
from creditors even where payable to the insured or the estate of the
insured, although the language of the statute is far from clear.)' 44
Third, the exemption does not apply to life insurance provided under
140. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.410 (1989):
(1) The lawful beneficiary, assignee, or payee of a life insurance policy ... heretofore or
hereafter effected by any person on his own life, or on the life of another, in favor of a person
other than himself, shall be entitled to the proceeds and avails of the policy against the
creditors and representatives of the insured and of the person effecting the insurance, and
such proceeds and avails shall also be exempt from all liability for any debt of such
beneficiary, existing at the time the proceeds or avails are made available for his own use.
(3) The exemptions provided by subsection (1)... shall not apply (a) to any claim to or
interest in such proceeds or avails by or on behalf of the insured, or the person so effecting
the insurance, or their administrators or executors, in whatever capacity such claim is made
or such interest is asserted ....
141. Id. § 48.18.420(1):
A policy of group life insurance or the proceeds thereof payable to the individual insured or
to the beneficiary thereunder, shall not be liable, either before or after payment, to be
applied to any legal or equitable process to pay any liability of any person having a right
under the policy. The proceeds thereof, when not made payable to a named beneficiary or to
a third person pursuant to a facility-of-payment clause, shall not constitute a part of the
estate of the individual insured for the payment of his debts.
142. I.R.C. § 2042 (West 1989). Moreover, section 2035 of the Internal Revenue Code
"recaptures" for the donor's estate any policy of life insurance on the life of the donor transferred
by the donor gratuitously within three years of the donor's death. I.R.C. § 2035(d)(2) (West
1989).
143. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.410(1) (1989). If, however, the proceeds are payable to the
insured or his estate only because the primary beneficiary has predeceased the insured, then the
exemption remains in force. Id. § 48.18.410(2)(b); see Elsom v. Gadd, 93 Wash. 603, 161 P. 483
(1916); Estate of Blattner, 89 Wash. 412, 154 P. 796 (1916).
144. The statute says:
A policy of group life insurance or the proceeds thereof payable to the individual insured or
the beneficiary thereunder, shall not be liable.., to pay any liability of any person having a
right under the policy. The proceeds thereof, when not made payable to a named beneficiary
or to a third person pursuant to a facility-of-payment clause, shall not constitute a part of
the estate of the individual insured for the payment of his debts.
WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.420(1) (1989).
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federal law to federal employees, although a separate federal exemp-
tion covers such insurance. 145 Finally, the exemption does not apply
to the proceeds of insurance to the extent of any premiums paid with
intent to defraud creditors, 146 nor to "any claim to or interest in such
proceeds ... by . . . any person to whom rights thereto have been
transferred with intent to defraud creditors."'147
The caveat is that support claims by children and former spouses
are not considered "creditors' claims" for purposes of this broad
exemption. In Aetna Life Insurance v. Bunt, 148 decided recently, the
state supreme court held:
[Tihe claims for child support, like those for spousal maintenance, are
not equivalent to the claims of 'creditors' to which the insurance pro-
ceeds exemption statute is directed. The basis for child support is the
natural obligation of a parent to support his or her children; the validity
of their claim does not depend upon either contract or judgment.' 4 9
Apparently the holding of Bunt is not limited to the life insurance
exemption provision, but would extend to any exemption of a dece-
dent's assets from the claims of "creditors." ' 150
Exemption of the proceeds of life insurance from creditors' claims is
quite common throughout the country,15 ' as is the denial of that
exemption for spousal and child support claims.' 52 Why there should
145. See, eg., 38 U.S.C.A. § 770(g) (West Supp. 1989) (concerning life insurance for federal
armed service personnel). "[P]ayments shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or
under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary."
Id.; see also 38 C.F.R. § 9.16 (1988).
146. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.410(3)(c) (1989).
147. Id § 48.18.410(3)(b). Ordinarily, the owner of an insurance policy retains the right to
change the beneficiary until he dies. Suppose that he buys life insurance at a time when he is not
insolvent. If he later designates a beneficiary (or fails to exercise his power to change the
beneficiary) with the intent that this will exempt the proceeds from his creditors at his death and
leave his estate insolvent, has he "transferred" rights to the proceeds with the intent to defraud
his creditors?
148. 110 Wash. 2d 368, 754 P.2d 993 (1988).
149. 110 Wash. 2d at 377, 754 P.2d at 998. The Bunt court "clarified" and corrected
language apparently to the contrary in Porter v. Porter, 107 Wash. 2d 43, 53-54, 726 P.2d 459,
464 (1986).
150. The court based its holding on a case holding that spousal and child support claims are
not "debts" or "liabilities" under an accident and health insurance exemption, Haakenson v.
Coldron, 190 Wash. 627, 630, 70 P.2d 294, 295 (1937), and on cases refusing to give force to a
statutory exemption of veterans' benefits from the claims and processes of creditors. Bunt, 110
Wash. 2d at 378-79, 754 P.2d at 999; Pishue v. Pishue, 37 Wash. 2d 750, 754-56, 203 P.2d 1070,
1073 (1949).
151. Effland, supra note 9, at 446-47.
152. . g., Green v. Green, 13 Mass. App. 340, 433 N.E.2d 92 (1982); Sinsel v. Sinsel, 47 Or.
App. 153, 614 P.2d 115 (Or. 1980); see Effland, supra note 9, at 447; Annotation, Enforcement of
Claim for Alimony or Support, on or for Attorney Fees and Costs Incurred in Connection,
105
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be such a broad exemption is more difficult to understand. In Bunt,
the court said that "[t]he purpose of exemption statutes such as RCW
48.18.410 is to protect the unfortunate debtor and save him a means of
supporting his family." 153 Why debtors who die with life insurance
should be considered more "unfortunate" or entitled to more protec-
tion than other dead debtors is not explained. The suggestion that the
exemption will "save him a means of supporting his family" seems to
presuppose that the insured has made his family the beneficiary of the
life insurance proceeds, either directly or indirectly. But the Washing-
ton exemption is not limited to such cases. It is fully available even if
the proceeds of the insurance are left to friends, business associates, or
paramours. Moreover, the proceeds of life insurance made payable to
someone other than family are not only exempt from creditors' claims;
they also are exempt from the claims of a surviving spouse or children,
no matter how needy, except insofar as they may be based on support
claims that arose before the insured's death or on community property
rights in the surviving spouse.
Even if the assumption were valid that most insureds designate their
families as beneficiaries of life insurance, there is no coordination of
this exemption with the other statutory mechanisms that more
expressly protect families of decedents. Thus, for example, a surviving
spouse is entitled to as much as $30,000 worth of homestead or award
in lieu of homestead free of most creditors' claims,' 54 as well as half of
the community property.t5 5 If it is sound public policy that surviving
spouses should be protected to that extent, then what rationale can
there be for according the surviving spouse who has been fortuitously
designated as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy an additional
unlimited exemption from creditors' claims for the insurance, whereas
a spouse who receives the same value by will or intestacy has no such
Therewith, Against Exemptions, 54 A.L.R. 2d 1422, 1424 (1957). But see Ridgway v. Ridgway,
454 U.S. 46 (1981) (federal exemption of military insurance from creditors' claims precludes
Maine court from subjecting life insurance proceeds to claims of insured's children even though
divorce decree required father to keep insurance in force for children).
153. 110 Wash. 2d at 377, 754 P.2d at 998; see also In re Elliott, 74 Wash. 2d 600, 621, 446
P.2d 347, 360 (1968) (also suggesting that one of the rationales of the exemption is to secure
"pecuniary aid and assistance to the beneficiary, usually someone who is dependent upon the
insured for support").
154. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 6.13.030, 6.13.070-.080, 11.52.010 (1989).
155. Id. § 26.16.030(1).
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further exemption? If the rationale behind the statute is family pro-
tection, then at a minimum it could and should be much more nar-
rowly crafted to achieve that result.156 Ideally, the exemption simply
should be deleted and the problem of family protection be addressed
fairly so as to protect all families, regardless of the form in which they
receive a decedent's property.
A more plausible rationale for the insurance exemption statutes is
one given in an earlier Washington case: "[T]he creditor can claim no
equity in a fund that had been in no way used as a basis for the
credit." '157 This at least explains, and to some extent justifies, the
broad exemption that exists. But it, too, suffers from problems of
overbreadth. First, it ignores the involuntary creditor, such as the tort
victim, who has not extended credit to the debtor but nevertheless may
have a valid claim against him or his estate. Second, it also ignores the
extent to which a voluntary creditor might extend credit based on
assets that are transmuted into life insurance proceeds at death.
Credit may be extended, for example, based on a debtor's savings and
earnings, and these assets may later be used to pay premiums on life
insurance rather than to pay the debt. While the statute makes an
exception for premiums paid with the intent to defraud creditors, it
will be difficult to prove in most cases that any one premium or series
of premiums was an intentional fraud on creditors.15 Nevertheless,
the cumulative diversion of the assets may be significant. Similarly, a
creditor could extend credit based on the paid-up cash value of life
insurance, if the statute did not also exempt that from creditors'
claims.
The "reliance" rationale, therefore, at the most supports an exemp-
tion from the claims of voluntary creditors. Even voluntary creditors
should not be precluded under that rationale to the extent they might
have relied (in the absence of an exemption statute) on the assets used
to purchase the policy or the cash value of the policy in extending
156. The exemption could be narrowed, for example, to exempt only life insurance payable to
spouse or dependents, and then only to the extent necessary to secure the $30,000 homestead or
award in lieu of homestead to such a person. In other words, life insurance proceeds payable to
spouse or dependents could be made subject to the family allowance staiutes, and similarly
limited.
157. Reiff v. Armour & Co., 79 Wash. 48, 52, 139 P. 633, 635 (1914).
158. But see Matter of Mehrer, 2 Bankr. 309 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1980), where an insolvent
businessman liquidated many of his assets just before declaring bankruptcy and used some of the
proceeds to purchase a paid-up $45,000 life insurance policy. The court held that the cash value
of this policy was includible in the bankruptcy estate under section 48.18.410(3)(c) on the ground
that the purchase of the policy was in fraud of his creditors.
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credit.159 Since we do not require creditors to prove that they actually
relied on other kinds of assets before we allow them to pursue them to
satisfy their claims, I see no reason why we should do so in the case of
life insurance. The exemption of life insurance proceeds from credi-
tors' claims therefore should be abolished. t60 Any family protection
that is required should be addressed directly by a suitable statute that
does not discriminate on the basis of the form of property transfer.
F Deferred Compensation Benefits
As with life insurance, death benefits under deferred compensation
plans generally are exempted from the claims of the employee's
creditors by statute. Pension benefits are, however, generally includ-
able in the employee's gross estate and subject to federal estate tax. t61
1. ERISA Plans
Broad protection from creditors has been included in the qualifica-
tion requirements for private pension plans under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), originally enacted in
1974.162 ERISA requires that in order to be qualified, a pension plan
"shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be
assigned or alienated."1 63  Although these provisions arguably only
prohibit voluntary alienation, the regulations make clear that they also
prohibit involuntary alienation:
159. Sometimes courts seem to be defending the life insurance exemption on the basis of
blatantly circular reasoning. In In re Elliott, 74 Wash. 2d 600, 621, 446 P.2d 347, 360 (1968), for
example, the court argued that "[n]o credit is extended to the insured on the faith of the
insurance, for all persons dealing with him are bound to know the law, and that money to
become due thereon when payable to a third person is exempt from their claims." (quoting
Murphy v. Casey, 150 Minn. 107, 109-110, 184 N.W. 783, 784 (1921)). While it is clearly true
that a reasonable creditor will not rely on property that is exempt from their claims in extending
credit, this is hardly a good reason for continuing the exemption. The issue is whether this
property should be exempt from creditors' claims, and whether creditors should be able to rely
on it in extending credit.
160. The Reader should not conclude that the Author is so naive as to suppose that this
proposal would be easy to enact. The life insurance companies have been remarkably effective in
securing creditors' exemptions for life insurance, and have marketed life insurance for years in
part on the basis of such an exemption. Since the large institutions that extend credit do not
seem particularly interested in changing the status quo, it may be very difficult to make any
meaningful change in this area. Nevertheless, the irrationality of the existing situation remains,
and it cries out for change as a simple matter of fairness.
161. I.R.C. § 2039 (West 1989).
162. Act effective Sept. 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1001-1461 (West 1985 & Supp. 1989)).
163. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(1) (1985); see also I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A) (West 1989).
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Under section 401(a)(13), a trust will not be qualified unless the plan of
which the trust is a part provides that benefits provided under the plan
may not be anticipated, assigned (either at law or in equity), alienated or
subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or other legal or
equitable process."'
164
The regulation has been found to be dispositive of the meaning of the
statute by the courts.1 61 Washington recently enacted a similar
exemption provision for employee benefit plans covered by ERISA.1
66
Although this provision does not appear to be in conflict with ERISA,
it nevertheless seems to be preempted by ERISA under a recent
Supreme Court case.
1 6 7
Prior to 1985, an exception to the ERISA spendthrift provision had
been judicially carved out for claims for alimony and child support on
the theory that spouses and children are the very class that the provi-
sion was designed to protect. 161 In 1984, however, Congress built such
protection into the statute as part of the Retirement Equity Act
(REA).169 REA authorizes payment of pension benefits to a "spouse,
former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant who is recog-
nized by a domestic relations order as having a right to receive all, or a
164. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (1988). A plan may, however, allow voluntary
assignment of up to 10% of benefits by plan members who have begun receiving benefits, and
may allow vested benefits to be assigned as security for loans from the plan to the beneficiary. Id.
§ 1.401(a)-13(d); I.RLC. § 401(a)(13)(A) (West 1989).
165. Kg., Tenneco, Inc. v. First Va. Bank, 698 F.2d 688 (4th Cir. 1983); General Motors
Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1980).
-166. WASH. Rnv. CODE § 6.15.010 (1989).
167. Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2182, 2185 (1988).
Interestingly, however, the Washington exemption provision appears to be broader than that in
ERISA, which covers only pension plans, and not welfare plans. Compare WASH. REV. CODE
§ 6.15.020(2) (1989) with 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(1) (West 1985); see Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2185-
91. The Washington statute appears to be preempted because it purports to cover only ERISA
plans. Id. at 2185; see In re Dyke, 99 Bankr. 343 (Bankr. S.D. Tex 1989); In re Hirsch, 98 Bankr.
1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989). Nonetheless, two recent bankruptcy court decisions in Washington
have apparently held to the contrary. In re Hiddleston, No. 88-00336 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1989),
discussed in Corbit, Retirement Funds, Are They Exempt from Creditors' Claims?, 17 WSBA
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. SEC. NEWS. 1, 8 (Spring 1989); In re Eisenhart, 88-05361 (Bankr.
W.D. Wash. 1989).
168. Bowen v. Bowen, 715 F.2d 559 (11th Cir. 1983); Operating Eng'rs Local No. 428 v.
Zamborsky, 650 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1981); Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, Seafarers Int. Union-Pacific Maritime Ass'n Pension Plan v. Stone, 453 U.S. 922 (1981);
Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); cf In re Marriage of Campa, 152 Cal.Rptr. 362, 89
Cal. App. 3d 113 (1979) (divorce court may order distribution of proceeds of pension to non-
earning spouse with community property rights in pension), appeal dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
169. REA is Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1433 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056 (West 1985)).
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portion of, the benefits payable under a plan with respect to such par-
ticipant."17'  A "domestic relations order" includes "any judgment,
decree, or order.., which (i) relates to the provision of child support,
alimony payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former
spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant, and (ii) is made
pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including community
property laws)." 17 1  Consequently, the Act clearly carves out an
exception for child and spousal support claims from the broad creditor
exemption that otherwise is required under ERISA.
2. State Pension Plans
State law controls plans established for state employees. 172 Typical
is the provision for public employees:
[T]he right of a person to a pension, an annuity, or retirement allow-
ance, any optional benefit, any other right accrued or accruing to any
person under the provisions of this chapter . . .and all moneys and
investments and income thereof, . . .shall not be subject to execution,
garnishment, attachment, the operation of the bankruptcy or insolvency
laws, or other process of law whatsoever, and shall be unassignable.,
73
Although expressly exempting public pension benefits from "execu-
tion, garnishment, attachment ... or other process of law," the stat-
utes now uniformly except support claims of spouses, former spouses,
and children from the exemption if they have become entitled to pen-
sion benefits pursuant to a mandatory benefits assignment order issued
by a court or a child support order. 174
170. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (West 1985); I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(13)(B), 414(p)(1)(B)(i),
414(p)(8) (West 1989).
171. I.R.C. § 414(p)(1)(B) (West 1989).
172. Employee benefit plans established by or maintained for the employees of any state or
political subdivision are not covered by ERISA. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1003(b)(1), 1002(32) (West
1985).
173. WASH. REV. CODE § 41.40.380 (1989); see also § 2.10.180(1) (judges); § 2.12.090
(judges); § 41.20.180 (police in first-class cities); § 41.26.180 (law enforcement and fire fighters);
§41.32.590 (teachers); §41.44.240 (state-wide city employees); §43.43.310 (state patrol).
Provisions exempting state government employee retirement benefits from creditors are common.
See generally Effland, supra note 9, at 447-48. It is unclear, however, whether such pension
benefits become subject to a decedent employee's creditors if they are paid to his estate (for lack
of alternative designated beneficiary, or as a result of express designation). Unlike the life
insurance exemption, this question is not addressed in pension plan statutes. The statutes can
therefore be read to exempt such funds from all claims against the employee, no matter when or
how asserted. Cf Boronat v. Boronat, 13 Wash. App. 671, 537 P.2d 1050 (1975) (court is
reluctant to carve out exceptions to the statute); see also Dickerson's Estate, 168 Misc. 54, 5
N.Y.S.2d 86 (1938).
174. Act of April 27, 1987, ch. 326, §§ 1-16, 1987 Wash. Laws 1152-62 (codified at WASH.
REV. CODE § 41.50.500-.901 (1989)) & Id. §§ 17-18, 22-25, 1987 Wash. Laws at 1163-68
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3. Federal Plans
Federal civil service and veterans retirement benefits also are
expressly exempted from creditors' claims.175 Civil service retirement
benefits are "not assignable... or subject to execution, levy, attach-
ment, garnishment, or other legal process, except as otherwise may be
provided by Federal laws." '176 Veterans retirement benefits "shall be
exempt from the claims of creditors, and shall not be liable to attach-
ment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process
whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary."' 77 Here,
however, a statutory exception to these exemption statutes has been
carved out for claims for both child support and alimony.17
Washington law expressly recognizes the federal exemption, although
federal law would control even in the absence of such recognition. 179
4. Comment
The broad protection from creditors accorded to deferred compen-
sation benefits generally has been justified on grounds that the
employee or the employee's family should not be left destitute as a
result of the employee's improvidence. Since we are concerned here
only with the rights of creditors upon the death of the employee, con-
cern for the employee's own well-being is irrelevant. Concern for the
employee spouse's family is pertinent, as it is with life insurance, but
(codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 2.10.180(1), 2.12.090, 41.20.180, 41.26.180, 41.32.590,
41.40.380, 41.44.240, 43.43.310 (1989)).
175. Employee benefit plans established by the federal government are also exempt from
ERISA. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1003(b)(1), 1002(32) (West 1985).
176. 5 U.S.C.A. § 8346 (West 1985).
177. 38 U.S.C.A. § 3101 (West Supp. 1989).
178. 42 U.S.C.A. § 659(a) (West 1983). Other kinds of claims may be barred even if the
benefits are payable to the debtor's estate. In Dickerson's Estate, 168 Misc. 54, 5 N.Y.S.2d 86
(1938), creditors of a former Post Office employee sought to reach civil service retirement benefits
that had been paid to his estate. The court rejected their claim, concluding that the
exemption.., includes every form of benefit, whether payable to the beneficiary himself in
his lifetime or after his death... directly to beneficiaries who may have been designated in
writing by the decedent, or, in the absence of a designation, to the administrator or executor
of his estate.... the exemption attached to the fund itself and when paid to the estate of the
decedent enured to the benefit of his sole next of kin... free from all claims against him or
his estate.
But compare Estate of McGreevy, 455 Pa. 318, 286 A.2d 355 (1971), which held that the state (as
a care provider) was entitled to reach federal disability benefits which had been paid to decedent's
guardian during his life. The court concluded that the federal statute only exempted the benefits
until they pagsed into the hands of the beneficiary, or in the instant case, his guardian.
179. "Any money received by any citizen of the state of Washington as a pension from the
government of the U.S.... shall be exempt from execution, attachment or seizure by or under
any legal process whatever." WASH. REV. CODE § 6.11.030 (1989).
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only in those instances where the employee has designated his or her
family to receive the benefits. 80 As with life insurance, however, pro-
tection of family from creditors under retirement plans seems over-
broad since it is not coordinated with other family protection
mechanisms such as the homestead exemption."' 1 Alternatively, inso-
far as the employee has designated someone other than family to
receive the benefits, the purported justification for the broad exemp-
tion vanishes altogether.
While it is unlikely that the creditors' protection provided by federal
law can be dislodged, the same does not apply to that provided under
state law. As with the life insurance provision, such protections
should be recast to accomplish valid purposes, and no more. t"2
G. Trusts
Norman Dacey must receive credit for popularizing the inter vivos
trust as a mechanism for avoiding probate,"8 3 although it has been in
180. Under the REA, a surviving spouse of an employee spouse is now required to be given a
survivor's annuity unless he or she has waived that right. I.R.C. § 401 (a)(l l)(A) (West 1988).
Thus, to a large extent, Congress has taken care of protecting spouses regardless of whether the
employee spouse does so voluntarily.
181. See related discussion involving life insurance exception, text accompanying notes
152-60.
182. Safeco Insurance Co. v. Skeen, 47 Wash. App. 196, 734 P.2d 41, review denied 108
Wash. 2d 1019 (1987), although it did not involve a decedent's estate, has particularly disturbing
implications for any effort to reform the existing statutory exemptions. In Skeen, the court of
appeals had before it the question whether stock appreciation rights, worth roughly $1.1 million,
granted by Boeing to a senior vice-president, could be reached to satisfy a $300,000 judgment.
Id. at 198-99, 734 P.2d at 42. The court held that they could not, even though there was no
statute exempting such rights from creditors. Id. at 202-03, 734 P.2d at 44. The court relied on
the family protection rationale behind the life insurance exemption statutes (discussed earlier)
and upon federal congressional intent behind restrictions on transfer imposed upon stock
appreciation rights under the Internal Revenue Code! Id. at 202, 734 P.2d at 44. In short, the
court discovered a public policy favoring exemption of employee benefits that had not been
exempted expressly by statute. Moreover, it seems to have found the family protection rationale
persuasive despite the shortcomings of that rationale mentioned in the text.
183. N. DACEY, How To AVOID PROBATE! (3d ed. 1985). This Article deals only with
trusts created by the settlor as a will substitute for himself or herself. One kind of trust interest
created by another may, however, be used as a will substitute by the beneficiary of the interest. If
a trust gives a person other than the settlor a general power of appointment, this may be used as a
will substitute by the power holder. The power holder of such a power is, of course, entitled to
appoint the property to himself or herself, so that it becomes their property outright. But instead
of doing this, the power holder may appoint the property to someone else, causing the property
to pass to the appointees without being probated in the power holder's estate. If the power was
exercised inter vivos by deed, then the power holder may avoid his or her creditors by doing this.
The general rule is that the creditors of the power holder can only reach the property if the
exercise of the power at that time was fraudulent as to the creditors. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF PROPERTY (Donative Transfers) § 13.5 (1986). If the general power is exercised by will,
however, there is a split of authority whether this will avoid the power holder's creditors. Some
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use for centuries.1 84 A trust is one of the simplest of the will substi-
tutes to employ, at least in theory, because by it a person can dispose
of personalproperty at death without even a written instrument (pro-
vided the terms of the trust can be proved).18 5 All a person needs to
do is to declare that he or she holds certain property in trust for speci-
fied beneficiaries and that it is to pass to those beneficiaries at the
death of the declarant. What the declarant has done is to convey to
the beneficiaries an equitable future interest, either a remainder or an
executory interest, that will vest in possession following the life of the
declarant. The future interest need not even be irrevocable: the declar-
ant may retain the power to revoke the trust, or to consume the princi-
pal, or may make the vesting of the future interest contingent on
satisfaction of any number of conditions." 6 Nevertheless, the prop-
erty will pass to the beneficiaries at the death of the settlor outside
probate if the trust is properly declared.
What are the rights of a creditor of a decedent Who has disposed of
property by such a trust? A venerable Washington statute provides
that "all deeds of gift, all conveyances, and all transfers or assign-
ments, verbal or written, of goods, chattels or things in action, made in
trust for the use of the person making the same, shall be void as against
the existing or subsequent creditors of such person."17 This statute
derives from an English statute of 1487 that has been enacted in sub-
stantially the same form in sixteen other jurisdictions.,, As a practi-
cal matter, most settlors who establish inter vivos trusts will retain
some beneficial interest in the trust estate during their lives. When
this has been done, the statute clearly subjects the trust assets to
claims against the settlor. Still, questions remain as to the scope of the
statute.
jurisdictions apparently hold that such appointed property is not available to the creditors of the
power holder. But the better rule is that property subject to the power can be subjected to the
claims against the power holder's estate. Id. § 13.4. Creditors will not, however, be able to reach
trust property subject to an unexercised general power of appointment in the power holder. Id.
§ 13.2.
184. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 452-53 (3d ed. 1984).
185. G. BOGERT, TRUSTS §§ 10-11 (6th ed. 1987). Transfers into trust, of course, must
comply with the statute of frauds. In Washington, this means that all transfers of realty,
including leases for more than one year, must be in writing. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 64.04.010-
.020; 59.04.010 (1989); see also id. § 19.36.010. Good practice, of course, dictates that all trusts
should be written and contain terms specifying everyone who is to have an interest in the
property until the trust terminates.
186. Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955).
187. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.36.020 (1989) (emphasis added).
188. 2A A. Scorr & W. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 156 (4th ed. 1987).
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First, what kind of trust property does it cover? The answer to this
should be straightforward. The phrase "goods, chattels or things in
action" means all personal property.1 89 Nonetheless, at least one
Washington case has applied the statute to a trust of real property
without mention of the limiting language, but in circumstances where
the transfer into trust also was found to be fraudulent as to credi-
tors.19 ° Similarly, in Leach v. Anderson,1 91 applying a Utah statute
identical to that in Washington, the Utah supreme court rejected an
argument that the statute did not apply to the real estate in trust, rea-
soning that the statute "is but a codification of the common law,
which ... refused to give recognition to trusts of this character."1 92
Second, does the statute mean that a creditor may reach the entire
trust estate, or only the settlor's beneficial interest? There seems to be
no Washington case deciding this. The Leach case, however, held that
a trust which reserved for the grantor such income and principal as
might be necessary to maintain her "in a reasonable standard of liv-
ing,"'1 9 with a remainder over to her children, was void in toto. The
court concluded that the "entire res, income and principal, is commit-
ted to maintain" grantor.' 94
The Utah court's reading of the common law is only partially cor-
rect. In the absence of statute, the general rule at common law is that
any beneficial interest in a trust that has been retained by the settlor
may be reached by creditors.'95 Thus, if the settlor was entitled to the
net income and there is accumulated income at settlor's death, settlor's
creditors may reach that income.' 96 If a settlor is entitled to discre-
tionary payments of income or principal, the settlor's creditors may
reach the property to the full extent of the trustee's discretion to
pay. 197 If the settlor has retained a future interest in the trust, the
189. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 823 (4th ed. 1957).
190. Carroll v. Carroll, 18 Wash. 2d 171, 138 P.2d 653 (1943).
191. 535 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1975)
192. Id. at 1244.
193. Id. at 1242.
194. Id. at 1243.
195. 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 188, § 156; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS,
§ 156 (1959).
196. 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 188, § 156, at 167; In re Camm's Estate, 76 Cal.
App. 2d 104, 172 P.2d 547 (Cal. App. 1946).
197. Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, 129 Conn. 211, 27 A.2d 166 (1942) (deciding settlor's
right to discretionary payment of income; creditor held entitled to accumulated income at death
of settlor); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 204 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1967)
(settlor's right to 25 percent of trust principal per year upon request and upon approval of
advisor to trustee held subject to creditor's claim at death of settlor); 2A SCoTT & FRATCHER,
supra note 188, § 156.2.
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interest is subject to creditors' claims. 9 If the settlor has retained a
general power of appointment in trust property, the property subject
to the power is available to the settlor's creditors regardless of whether
it has been exercised.1 99 Finally, a spendthrift clause in a trust does
not protect a settlor's trust interest from his creditors.2 °° Thus, the
common law is careful not to invalidate the whole trust, but only to
invalidate it to the extent of the retained interests.
If the statute is intended as a codification of the common law, then
the Utah court's conclusion is in error. Insofar as the settlor has given
away beneficial rights to the trust property irrevocably during his or
her life, the settlor's creditors should not be entitled to reach those
beneficial interests absent a showing of actual fraud at the time the
settlor parted with them.2 °1
Suppose, however, that the settlor has retained no beneficial interest
other than the power to revoke? One would suppose that this is as
good as retaining a right to consume the whole of the trust principal.
Nevertheless, one of the few Washington cases that construes this stat-
ute reaches a curious result on this question. In Van Stewart v. Town-
send,02 the settlor of a trust for the benefit of his children reserved
only the right to revoke the trust. A year later, after the settlor had
apparently become insolvent, he relinquished the right to revoke. The
question arose whether the settlor's creditors could reach the property
while it was subject to the power to revoke, since the release of the
power was fraudulent as to creditors. The court held that the reserved
power to revoke, or power to direct investments, does not constitute
uses for the "benefit" of the settlor made void by the statute. 03
Interestingly, this was the common law rule. If the settlor had
retained merely a power to revoke or amend the trust, the property
generally was not subject to the settlor's creditors. The rule seems to
198. McKenna v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 35 Wash. 2d 662, 214 P.2d 664 (1950) (settlor's
reversionary interest in trust sold to satisfy creditor's claim).
199. 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 188, at 169-71; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY (Donative Transfers) § 13.3 (1986). If the settlor has retained only a special power of
appointment in trust property, however, the property subject to the power is not available to the
settlor's creditors. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Donative Transfers) § 13.1 (1986).
200. 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 188, § 156.1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 156 (1959).
201. See WASH. REv. CODE § 19.40 (1989).
202. 176 Wash. 311, 28 P.2d 999 (1934).
203. Contra Herd v. Chambers, 158 Kan. 614, 149 P.2d 583 (1944).
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have been based on the theory that a power is not property.2°4 None-
theless, there is no sound basis for this rule today, particularly when it
is compared to the treatment of general powers of appointment.2 °5 At
least where the effect of the exercise of the power would be to revest
the property in the power holder, a power to revoke is tantamount to a
general power of appointment. Happily, therefore, the common law
rule appears to be on its way out.20 6 The creditors of a person holding
such a power would, under modem cases, be entitled to reach the
property subject to the power at the power holder's death.20 7 It is to
be hoped that our courts would reach this result were they to be called
upon to decide it today. 208 But there is no reason to wait for that day.
Our statute should be amended to clarify the rights of creditors to
such trust property, as have the statutes of many states.20 9 A statutory
proposal which is discussed further in Section V, below, would estab-
lish a procedure for processing creditors' claims against such trust
204. See Jones v. Clifton, 101 U.S. 225 (1880); 4 ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 119, at 373;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 330, comment o (1959).
205. See generally Rights of Creditors, supra note 58, at 1192-94; Schuyler, Revocable Trusts
- Spouses, Creditors and Other Predators, 8 INST. ON EST. PL. 13-1, 13-19 to 13-21 (1974).
206. The Internal Revenue Code, of course, includes property subject to a power to revoke in
the taxable estate of the power holder. I.R.C. § 2038 (West 1989). The Bankruptcy Code would
also include property subject to a power that can be exercised for the bankrupt's benefit in the
bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (a)(1), (b) (West 1979 & Supp. 1989). The First
Restatement of Property, section 318 (comment i), excluded powers of revocation from the
definition of a general power of appointment. The Second Restatement, however, would now
include the power to revoke under the definition, thus making property subject to a power of
revocation subject to creditors under the Restatement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
(Donative Transfers) § 11.1, comment c (1984).
207. Three recent cases have held that trust property subject to a power to revoke in the
settlor is available to creditors' claims at the death of the settlor, and these may herald a trend.
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Reiser, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 633, 389 N.E.2d 768 (1979); Estate of
Kovalyshyn, 136 N.J. Super. 40, 343 A.2d 852 (1975) (creditor of insolvent estate allowed to
reach revocable "Dacey" declaration of trust of mutual funds); Johnson v. Commercial Bank,
284 Or. 675, 588 P.2d 1096 (1978). Here again, the UFTA may provide relief for a creditor on
the theory that a settlor who retained a power to revoke a trust has not "transferred" his
beneficial interest to the property until the power to revoke is released or extinguished by death.
See supra notes 27-42 for a discussion of fraudulent transfers.
208. Safeco Insurance Co. v. Skeen, 47 Wash. App. 196, 734 P.2d 41, review denied 108
Wash. 2d 1019 (1987), however, raises some question about this. One of the grounds for
rejecting the creditor's claim against the stock appreciation rights in that case was that the rights
were not "property" subject to execution. Rather, they were "a species of option purely personal
to the judgment debtor," id. at 200, 734 P.2d at 43, and were in no way binding on Boeing until
the holder chose to exercise them. This reasoning that a power is not property is virtually
indistinguishable from the traditional ground for refusing to expose property subject to an
unexercised power to creditors' claims.
209. 4 ScoTT & FRATCHER, supra note 119, § 330.12, at 374-76.
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assets. It includes language that would subject trust property over
which the settlor has retained powers to creditors' claims.
21 0
H. Other Transfers Containing Payable on Death Provisions
In addition to the kinds of will substitutes discussed so far, Wash-
ington has adopted an important provision from the UPC that is
designed to facilitate the use of almost any kind of transfer as a will
substitute.2 1 The statute declares that an instrument providing "that
any property which is the subject of the instrument shall pass to a
person designated by the decedent in either the instrument or a sepa-
rate writing" is deemed to be "nontestamentary" and is not invali-
dated for failure to comply with the formalities for executing wills.
212
The provision covers almost any kind of property transfer imagina-
ble.213 A recent decision by the Washington Supreme Court suggests
that this provision may not only protect otherwise valid conveyances
from invalidation for failure to comply with the wills act, but may
breath life into instruments that would not otherwise be valid
conveyances.214
In language that is reminiscent of that found in the joint tenancy
and community property provisions, section 11.02.090 has this to say
about creditors' rights: "Nothing in this section limits the rights of
creditors under other laws of this state."2 5 As with those other stat-
utes, the same question arises: What are the "rights of creditors" pre-
served by this statute?
Apart from the kinds of POD conveyances already discussed-life
insurance, pensions, POD bank accounts-there is little law in Wash-
ington on the rights of creditors where property passes under a POD
provision. What authority there is suggests that creditors' rights may
210. See infra Appendix, Section V.
211. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.090 (1989). The section was adopted in Washington in
1974. Act of Feb. 13, 1974, ch. 117, § 54, 1974 Wash. Laws 314-15. It is almost identical to
former section 6-201 of the Uniform Probate Code, although the Washington version contains a
third section dealing with safety deposit boxes that is not found in the UPC section. U.P.C. § 6-
201 has recently been amended and redesignated as § 6-101. 1989 Amendments to UPC, supra
note 4.
212. WASH. REv. CODE § 11.02.090 (1989).
213. The "instruments" expressly contemplated by this provision are insurance policies,
employment contracts, bonds, mortgages, promissory notes, deposit agreements, pension plans,
joint tenancies, community property agreements, trust agreements, conveyances, or "any other
written instrument effective as a contract, gift, conveyance, or trust." Id. § 11.02.090(1).
214. Estate of O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d 913, 749 P.2d 154 (1988) (holding that an undelivered
deed was effective to convey title to the named grantee at the death of the grantor under this
section).
215. WAsH. REv. CODE § 11.02.090(2) (1989).
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turn on whether the POD designation was irrevocable when made and
binding on the original owner at that time.
Two cases are illustrative. In In re Lewis' Estate,216 Lewis sold prop-
erty to his son for a specified sum, part of which was payable in install-
ments, with the obligation to pay secured by a second mortgage. The
contract further provided that "if, at the time of [seller's] death, there
remains any sum due ... in that event said note and mortgage shall be
declared null and void and [seller] will provide for such cancellation in
his Will."'2 17 Lewis did execute a will directing his executors to cancel
the note and satisfy the mortgage of record, reciting the agreement as
the reason for this direction. The probate court authorized the execu-
tor to satisfy the mortgage as directed and creditors of the estate peti-
tioned to vacate the order, seeking to have the mortgage retained as an
asset of the estate. The supreme court rejected the creditors' petition,
holding that, as the contract created a "present enforceable and bind-
ing right over which the promisor has no control without the consent
of the promisee, '218 it constituted a valid non-testamentary disposi-
tion. The property right passed free of the creditors' claims. 219
In Decker v. Fowler,220 however, the court held that a POD designa-
tion on United States bonds was ineffective to transfer ownership at
death since the purchaser "had the right, during his lifetime, to call for
the payment of the bonds, and,... the proceeds of the bonds had not
passed beyond his dominion and control during his lifetime. 221
Although giving effect to the designation in that case apparently
would not have left the estate insolvent, the holding was based, at least
in part, on a concern that the rights of the POD beneficiary should not
be superior to the purchaser's creditors. "The right of the owner of
property to give away his property is always subject to the rights of his
creditors. 222
216. 2 Wash. 2d 458, 98 P.2d 654 (1940).
217. Id. at 460, 98 P.2d at 654.
218. Id. at 469, 98 P.2d at 658.
219. Cf Estate of Moss v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1239 (1980), acq. 1981-1 C.B. 2 (similar
result under federal estate tax law).
220. 190 Wash. 549, 92 P.2d 254 (1939).
221. Id. at 552, 92 P.2d at 256. This case is almost certainly erroneous as to federal law,
which governs U.S. bonds, and its holding that POD instruments are testamentary is moot as a
matter of state law because of the omnibus statute. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.090 (1989); see
also Toulouse v. New York Life Ins. Co, 40 Wash. 2d 538, 545-46, 245 P.2d 205, 209 (1952)
(questioning Decker). But the concern expressed in the concurrence of Justice Beals that the
rights of POD beneficiaries should not be superior to those of the purchaser's creditors, discussed
in the text, may have continuing vitality.
222. 199 Wash. at 552, 92 P.2d at 256 (Beals, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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These two cases differ in that the POD designation in Lewis was
binding on the owner and irrevocable when made, but in Decker it was
not. Where a person has made a complete surrender of a property
interest during life, as the father did in Lewis, creditors should not be
able to reach that property interest at the death of the transferor
unless they can show it was fraudulent when made under the
UFTA.223 If, however, the transferor has retained valuable property
interests until death, then these should be reachable by creditors at the
death of a debtor whose estate is left otherwise insolvent. The statu-
tory proposal included in the Appendix retains this distinction by
exposing only beneficial interests retained by the decedent up until
death to the decedent's creditors.
IV. GIFTS CAUSA MORTIS
Although not very common, gifts causa mortis are recognized in
Washington as a valid non-testamentary method of disposing of prop-
erty "at death." To be valid, such gifts must be made (1) in apprehen-
sion of approaching death from sickness or peril, (2) the donor must
die from the sickness or peril without revoking the gift, (3) there must
be actual, constructive, or symbolic delivery, and (4) there must be an
intent to pass title.224
The case of McCarton v. Watson 2 25 shows how potent gifts causa
mortis may be as will substitutes. The decedent, Ms. Watson, had
been befriended and cared for by her apartment manager, Mr.
McCarton. Two days before she died, in the presence of a friend of
Mr. McCarton's, she said she thought she was dying and asked
McCarton to write down her wishes for the disposition of her assets.
She directed that McCarton should receive her stocks and bonds, her
sister the funds in a bank account, and the children of one of
McCarton's siblings the rest of her property. McCarton read his tran-
scription to Ms. Watson. She said it was fine but that she was unable
to sign it. Two days later, Ms. Watson died, with a valid will which
made dispositions quite different than those McCarton had tran-
scribed. Nevertheless, the court held that her actions two days before
she died constituted an effective gift causa mortis of her whole estate
(which was valued at $589,600 at her death).
223. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.40 (1989).
224. In re McDonald's Estate, 60 Wash. 2d 452, 374 P.2d 365 (1962); Phinney v. State, 36
Wash. 236, 78 P. 927 (1904); McCarton v. Estate of Watson, 39 Wash. App. 358, 693 P.2d 192
(1984).
225. 39 Wash. App. 358, 693 P.2d 192 (1984).
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There do not seem to be any cases in Washington on the question
whether gifts causa mortis are subject to donor's creditors. 2 6 In other
jurisdictions, however, gifts causa mortis generally are held to be sub-
ject to decedent's debts if the decedent's estate is otherwise insufficient
to pay claims.227 The PR may recover property in the hands of the
donee, or the proceeds of such property, insofar as is necessary to sat-
isfy claims of decedent's creditors.228 Presumably, Washington courts
would follow this rule if the question arose. Whether there needs to be
a probate opened, and a PR appointed, to reach such gift property,
however, is unclear. There is no reason why it should be necessary
where, as in the McCarton case, the decedent gave her whole estate
away causa mortis.
V. A UNIFIED STATUTORY PROCEDURE FOR
CREDITORS' CLAIMS AGAINST NONPROBATE
ASSETS
Throughout the foregoing discussion, several piecemeal statutory
reforms have been recommended: modification of the nonclaims stat-
ute to make clear that it will cut off claims against nonprobate assets,
modification of the "creditors' provisos" in the community property
agreement and joint tenancy statutes to clarify what creditors' rights
have been preserved, and repeal of the unlimited exemption provided
for creditors' claims against life insurance and retirement benefits.
Suggested legislation that effectuates these recommendations is
included in an Appendix to this Article.
In addition to these piecemeal reforms, however, some unified statu-
tory procedure needs to be devised to handle claims by creditors
against nonprobate assets. As it is presently structured, the existing
probate code purports only to deal with "Probate and Trust Law,"
suggesting that only one type of nonprobate asset (assets held in inter
vivos trusts) are covered. More important, there are no provisions
made therein, or elsewhere, for the processing of creditors' claims
against nonprobate assets. This situation needs to be remedied if the
present state of confusion with regard to such claims is to be remedied.
The threshold question with regard to such a procedure is whether
the processing of creditors' claims against nonprobate assets should be
226. But see Phinney, 36 Wash. 236, 78 P. 927 (suggesting that the absence of creditors in that
case made it easier to conclude that there was a valid gift causa mortis).
227. 1 PAGE ON WILLS § 7.18 (Bowe & Parker ed. 1960); T. ATKINSON, THE LAW OF WILLS
§ 116 (2d ed. 1953).
228. 1 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 227, § 7.18; T. ATKINSON, supra note 227, § 116.
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placed exclusively in the hands of a PR. A provision of a comprehen-
sive bill introduced in Washington in 1971, for example, would have
required the recipients of certain kinds of nonprobate assets to account
to a PR insofar as necessary to satisfy the claims of creditors, provided
that the creditors had filed claims with the PR.229 A similar provision
was recently enacted in Missouri as part of a comprehensive bill on
nonprobate transfers.2 30 Implicit in these provisions, which were
modeled on the Uniform Probate Code section dealing with creditors'
229. S. 313, supra note 124. Section l1iA.6-301, in relevant part, provided as follows:
No joint tenancy existing under RCW 64.28.010 and no community property agreement
existing under RCW 26.16.120 will be effective against the estate of a deceased joint tenant
or deceased party to such agreement to vest in or transfer to a survivor property needed to
pay debts, taxes, and expenses of administration, including statutory allowances to the
surviving spouse, minor children and dependent children. Surviving joint tenants and a
surviving party to such an agreement shall be liable to account to the [PR] for property
beneficially owned by the decedent at the time of his death as his separate property or by the
decedent and the surviving spouse as their community property.... No proceeding to assert
this liability shall be commenced unless the [PR] has received written demand by a surviving
spouse, a creditor or one acting for a minor or dependent child of the decedent, and no
proceeding shall be commenced later than two years following the death of the decedent.
Property recovered by the [PR] shall be administered as part of the decedent's estate.
Section I1A.6-107 of the same bill contained similar provisions for pursuing property held in
multi-party bank accounts. These sections were modeled closely on the UPC, although the UPC
provides for creditors' claims only against multi-party bank accounts. UPC § 6-107 (1983). -Sen-
ate Bill 313 represented a comprehensive reform of the probate code that would have enacted the
UPC in Washington. It was never enacted.
230. Nonprobate Transfers Law of Missouri, supra note 7, at § 40. The section, in relevant
part, reads as follows:
Section 40. 1. If a deceased owner's probate estate is not sufficient to pay claims, taxes and
expenses of administration, including statutory allowances to the surviving spouse, minor
children and dependent children, the beneficiaries that receive a nonprobate transfer of
decedent's property.., and the persons who receive other property of the decedent by a
transfer other than from the administration of the decedent's probate estate that was subject
to satisfaction of the decedent's debts during the decedent's lifetime, shall be liable to
account to the decedent's personal representative for a pro rata share of the value received
or forgiven of property that the decedent owned beneficially immediately before death to the
extent necessary to discharge the claims and charges remaining unpaid after application of
subsection shall not apply to a death benefit paid pursuant to life or accidental death
insurance policy, contract, trust, plan or law; and it does not apply to survivorship rights in
property held as tenants by the entireties.
2. Only decedent's personal representative may enforce the obligation of decedent's
beneficiaries under subsection 1 of this section by bringing an action for accounting, but no
proceeding to assert this liability shall be commenced unless the personal representative has
received a written demand therefor by a creditor.., and no proceeding shall be brought for
accounting... more than two years following the decedent's death. Sums recovered by the
personal representative shall be administered as part of the decedent's estate.
3. After an action for accounting has been commenced... any party to the proceeding may
join and bring into the action... beneficiaries of other nonprobate transfers of the decedent.
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rights against multi-party bank accounts, 3 ' is the assumption that a
PR is necessary to process such claims.
The argument for such a position is fairly easy to understand. His-
torically, it has been the job of a PR to provide a focus for the accom-
modation of a variety of potentially conflicting interests in the
administration of an estate, among them the interests of heirs and
devisees, the interests of family, and the interests of creditors. If non-
probate property is to be integrated into the estate administration pro-
cess, it is only natural to assume that it will be the job of the PR to do
this.
Clearly where a PR has been appointed, the position taken in the
1971 proposal and the Missouri statute is a sound one. Where a PR is
appointed, it is obviously simpler and most efficient to authorize that
person to draw on the nonprobate assets to satisfy valid claims. But
suppose that those interested in the estate have, for whatever reason,
concluded that appointment of a PR is not otherwise necessary. There
may, for example, be no probate estate, or the amount of probate
property may fall within the "small estate" procedure.2 3 2 At present,
apparently, many creditors rely on voluntary measures to obtain pay-
ment of their claims because probate is too expensive.2 33 Many recipi-
ents of nonprobate property may be content to compromise claims
without having a PR appointed, particularly where one person has
received the bulk of the decedent's property. There is no obvious rea-
son, under these circumstances, why creditors' rights to reach such
assets should require the appointment of a PR. If creditors' claims
can be settled amicably by those receiving nonprobate assets without
the need for a probate administration, then there should be a mecha-
nism in place to allow this. Even if an amicable settlement cannot be
reached without the need for court intervention, it may be possible to
resolve the dispute without the appointment of a PR, and the parties
should be entitled to try to do so.
If a PR is not appointed at this stage, of course, then the risk is that
there might be a multiplicity of suits and controversies, and no single
person will be in a position to insist on a fair and uniform treatment of
the competing claims. Historically it has been the function of the PR
to perform that job. If it becomes clear that a PR needs to be
231. UPC § 6-107, 9 U.L.A. 529 (1983).
232. Estates with total probate property amounting to less than $30,000 may be administered
without appointment of a PR under RCW chapter 11.62.
233. Langbein, supra note 5, at 1121-24.
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appointed to perform this role, the parties should be authorized to
petition the court for such an appointment.
A statutory proposal that would accomplish this with regard to all
forms of nonexempt nonprobate property is included in the Appen-
dix.234 It contains two basic components. The first provides for notice
to creditors; the second provides for the processing of claims that have
been filed by creditors.
The notice provision establishes a procedure for notice to creditors
where no PR has been appointed.235 Under this proposal, a person
who has obtained an adjudication of testacy or intestacy, or a trustee
having authority over the decedent's property, or any person who has
received property by reason of the decedent's death, is authorized to
give notice to creditors. All the duties imposed on a PR to give actual
notice to "known or reasonably ascertainable creditors should apply
with equal force to any person seeking to bar such creditors' claims
without the appointment of a PR. Otherwise, there could be due pro-
cess questions.236 The proposed amendment accomplishes this by
incorporating the kind of notice required by "RCW 11.40.010 and
related sections.1
2 37
Technical changes to the form of notice will be required to reflect
that no PR has been appointed, and these are set out in the proposal.
The proposal also would require that the notice advise creditors of
their right to seek appointment as PR for the decedent.238 This
requirement seems reasonable given that others have not sought such
appointment.
If the creditor does not wish to seek such appointment, the person
giving notice should be required to allow or reject the claim in the
same manner as would a PR.2 39 The parties should then be permitted
to try to settle any claims still in dispute after this determination with-
out triggering more formal court procedures. There is nothing in the
234. See infra Appendix, Sections IV and V.
235. See infra Appendix, Section IV. Where a PR has been appointed, the existing nonclaims
procedure, with the proposed amendment to make clear that it will bar claims against
nonprobate assets, should be sufficient. See infra Appendix, Section I.
236. See Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1340 (1988). This is not
the place to discuss whether Tulsa would apply where no PR has been appointed. It is quite
possible that there would be insufficient state action to trigger due process protections under such
circumstances. Id. at 1345-46. In that event, the legislature could decide to dispense with notice
requirements altogether. Even if constitutional, however, this would not seem good public
policy. Those wishing to avoid probate should not be given an opportunity to avoid creditors
indirectly by having the advantage of reduced notice requirements.
237. See infra Appendix, Section IV, Proposed WASH. REV. CODE § 11.40.xxx(a).
238. Id.
239. Id. Proposed § 11.40.xxx(b).
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proposal to preclude them from doing so. In most cases, these proce-
dures should be sufficient to dispose of creditors' claims.
If, however, the parties are not willing or able to settle the claim by
themselves, some more formal mechanism for settling the creditors'
claims must be available. With suitable amendment of the probate
code as proposed in the Appendix, both probate and (nonexempt) non-
probate property should be available to satisfy creditors' claims. The
proposal therefore provides that a claimant should be entitled to bring
suit for the payment of the claim against anyone believed to have
received nonexempt property from the decedent. 2" If there are a vari-
ety of such transferees, however, this approach may be more compli-
cated than would the existing probate procedure. For that reason, the
proposed statute would authorize either the claimant or the notice-
giver to petition the court for appointment of a personal representa-
tive,241 who would then perform the role of processing creditors'
claims as has been the practice in the past.
The second component of the unified procedure would establish
that, except insofar as expressly exempted by statute from creditors'
claims, nonprobate transfers will not be effective to transfer property
of a decedent that is necessary to pay the decedent's debts, taxes, or
expenses of administration. It also would establish a procedure for
collecting from nonprobate transferees to satisfy creditors' claims.
This statute is based largely on the 1971 proposal and the Missouri
statute described earlier.242 In a number of respects, however, the pro-
posed statute differs from these precursors.
First, as noted above, the 1971 proposal and the Missouri statute
would require appointment of a PR before nonprobate property can be
reached. For the reasons discussed earlier,243 this seems unnecessarily
restrictive, and the statute has been modified to require nonprobate
transferees to account to a PR only if one has been appointed. Other-
wise, such transferees must account directly to the decedent's
creditors.
In those situations where a PR has been appointed, if a PR is to
administer nonprobate property as part of the probate estate for pur-
poses of paying creditors, it will be necessary to decide whether non-
probate property should be treated equally with the type of probate
240. Id.
241. Id. Proposed § 11.40.xxx(c).
242. S. 313, supra note 124, at § I 1A.6-301 (quoted supra note 229); Nonprobate Transfers
Law of Missouri, supra note 7, at § 40 (quoted supra note 230).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 231-234.
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property that it most closely resembles for purposes of abatement, or
whether it should be preferred before all kinds of probate assets, so
that it will only be liable if all probate property has been exhausted.
Absent some persuasive reason for preferring nonprobate property,
our basic societal committment to equality would indicate that it
should be treated the same as probate property in responding to credi-
tors' claims. The only reason for preferring nonprobate property that
seems even plausible would be one based on some presumed intent on
the part of the decedent that these transfers should be the last to be
disturbed to satisfy debts. Perhaps some such intent on the part of the
transferor can be inferred from the decision to avoid probate as to
such property, on the theory that the transferor realized that it would
be more difficult for creditors to pursue property transferred outside of
probate. But, this is scant basis for such an inference given that there
are good reasons to avoid probate that do not relate to avoiding credi-
tors. Moreover, a testator is free to express such an intent if he or she
wants to. Accordingly, I have concluded that equal treatment of pro-
bate and nonprobate transfers is the fairest approach.
Failure to accord to nonprobate assets a preferred status above pro-
bate property will, however, add complexity to the scheme of credi-
tors' rights and may expose many nonprobate transfers to creditors'
claims, even though there are ample probate assets to satisfy such
claims.2' But this is a complexity that seems demanded by fair-
ness. 245 For these reasons, it seems preferable to treat nonprobate
property as if it were probate property for purposes of creditors'
claims. This is the basic approach that has been followed in the pro-
posal contained in the Appendix.24 6 If, however, the decedent wishes
to have nonprobate property given a preferred status, this can be
accomplished by a suitable expression of that intent in his or her will.
244. Presumably for that reason, the 1971 proposal and the Missouri statute would expose
nonprobate assets to creditors' claims only if the probate assets had been exhausted. S. 313, supra
note 124, at § 1A.3-917(b); Nonprobate Transfers Law of Missouri, supra note 7, § 40(l).
245. This is the judgment that has been made with regard to federal and state estate taxes,
which are assessed without preference against both probate and nonprobate property, in
proportion to the amount of each kind of property. I.R.C. § 2206 (West 1989) (life insurance);
§ 2207 (West 1989) (property subject to power of appointment); WAsH. REV. CODE
§§ 83.110.010-.904 (1989) (apportionment of state and federal estate taxes in Washington).
246. See infra Appendix, Section V, Proposed WASH. REV. CODE § 1.40.zzz(c). For
purposes of abatement, it seems reasonable to treat nonprobate transfers as if they were specific
bequests, which are ordinarily given a preferred status among probate assets. Nonprobate assets
will either be akin to bequests of specific items of property, or they will be akin to demonstrative
bequests, which are gifts charged on any specific property or fund. There is no clear reason for
preferring specific bequests over demonstrative bequests, and so they should abate equally.
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Second, the time period in the 1971 proposal and the Missouri stat-
ute (two years) seems difficult to justify. Certainly something beyond
the four months allowed for creditors' claims under Washington law
must be allowed to permit the notice-giver sufficient time to determine
whether the probate estate is sufficient to satisfy the claims made. In
many estates, it also will be necessary to calculate the federal and state
estate tax liability before it can be determined whether the probate
estate is sufficient to satisfy claims. Those taxes must be paid within
nine months of death, but a final determination of the tax may not be
obtained until some time after that.247 Washington's estate tax appor-
tionment act does not impose on a fiduciary a duty to seek to recover
tax from nonprobate transferees liable for the tax until three months
after the final determination of tax.248 It seems practical, therefore, to
adopt the same time limit for PR's who may wish to pursue nonpro-
bate assets for other purposes. In those cases where no estate tax is
due, the PR should therefore have precisely one year to institute
action, which represents the nine month deadline for the filing of the
estate tax return, plus the three month time allowed in the apportion-
ment act.2 49 In some cases, however, there will be a dispute with cred-
itors or taxing authorities as to final liability, or other good cause may
exist for an extension. It seems advisable, therefore, to allow the PR,
in such circumstances, to petition a court for an extension of time
within which to pursue nonprobate assets.25°
Next, the 1971 proposal was limited to property passing under
multi-party bank accounts, community property agreements or joint
tenancies. These may be the most important kinds of nonprobate
transfer that are not expressly exempted from creditors' claims by stat-
ute. Nevertheless, there is no obvious reason why other kinds of non-
probate transfers (such as inter vivos trusts) should be excluded by
omission. A generic treatment of nonprobate transfers, with an exclu-
sion for those expressly exempted from creditors' claims by statute,
seems preferable. This is the approach taken by the recent Missouri
statute.2  It will, therefore, be necessary to define "nonprobate trans-
fers" and "nonprobate property." As any one who has attempted to
247. I.R.C. § 6075(a) (West 1989).
248. WASH. REV. CODE § 83.110.070 (1989).
249. If using the final determination of tax as the trigger proves too complicated, then a flat
one year would seem preferable to the two years in the 1971 proposal and the Missouri Act.
Interestingly, the recent amendments of the UPC creditors' claim provision for multi-party bank
accounts has replaced the former two year limit with one a year limit. 1989 Amendments to the
UPC, supra note 4, at § 6-215(b).
250. See infra Appendix, Section V, Proposed WASH. REV. CODE § 11.40.zzz(a).
251. Nonprobate Transfers Law of Missouri, supra note 7, § 40(1).
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explain the law of decedents' estates knows well, it is notoriously diffi-
cult to define the concept of "nonprobate property" except by refer-
ence to what is included in the probate estate. I have no illusion that
my initial attempt is completely satisfactory.252 In addition to the
generic definition, therefore, a non-exhaustive enumeration of the most
common kinds of nonprobate transfers seems useful. A preliminary
attempt has been made to draft such a description.253 It is, however,
preliminary only.
Fourth, as explained in Section III.G. above, there is an ongoing
uncertainty under Washington law whether the retention of certain
kinds of powers over property, such as the power to revoke a disposi-
tion in trust, or the power to change a beneficiary of a trust, would
expose the property subject to the power to the power holder's credi-
tors at death.254 Where the retained power is tantamount to beneficial
ownership, there is no reason the property subject to the power should
be immune from creditors. The proposed statute makes it clear that
property subject to such powers would be available to creditors.255
This would bring Washington law into conformity with the modem
rule throughout the country, and with the approach taken by the fed-
eral government in the gift and estate tax area.
Finally, there is an important omission in this proposal which
should be noted. Under the 1971 proposal and the Missouri statute,
the liability of nonprobate transferees could be asserted not only to
satisfy creditors, but also to satisfy the claims of surviving spouse,
minor children and dependent children to statutory allowances. 256
This would be an important change of the law as it exists in Washing-
ton. Today, nonprobate assets are not subject to the claims of spouses
252. See infra Appendix, Section V, Proposed WASH. REV. CODE § 11.40.zzz(b). The
Nonprobate Transfers Law of Missouri defines "nonprobate transfer" to mean:
a transfer after death [by] one or more persons of money, benefits, or property owned or
controlled by the decedent, pursuant to a beneficiary designation or a writing that is not a
will, and includes forgiveness of a debt or a promise that ceases to be subject to an obligation
to pay or be performed by reason of the death of one of the parties to the agreement. A
nonprobate transfer... does not include survivorship rights in property held as joint tenants
or tenants by the entirety, or a transfer to a remainderman on termination of a life tenancy,
or a transfer under a trust established by an individual either inter vivos or testamentary, or
a transfer made on death of a person who did not have the right to designate his or her
estate as the beneficiary of the transfer.
Nonprobate Transfers Law of Missouri, supra note 7, at § 18(5). The exclusion of joint tenan-
cies, remainder and trust interests seems unnecessarily restrictive and so the proposal contained
in the Appendix is not similarly restricted.
253. See infra Appendix, Section V, Proposed WASH. REV. CODE § 11.40.zzz(b).
254. See supra text accompanying notes 202-08.
255. See infra Appendix, Section V, Proposed WASH. REV. CODE § 11.40.zzz(d).
256. See supra notes 229-230.
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or dependents for statutory allowances. This, I believe, is unjustifi-
able. Moreover, any system that exposes nonprobate assets to the
claims of creditors, but not to the rights of family, would be indefen-
sible. Any adequate treatment of the problem of claims against non-
probate assets, therefore, should include provision for spousal and
dependents' claims in addition to those of creditors. Nonetheless,
such claims are outside the scope of this Article, and therefore have
not been included as part of the proposal.
VI. CONCLUSION
The law on creditors' rights to reach nonprobate transfers at the
death of a debtor is in a terrible state of confusion. In some cases (life
insurance and pensions), the legislature has carved out exemptions
from creditors' claims that are far broader than can be justified. In
others (multi-party bank accounts, revocable trusts), there is no clear
law in Washington as to whether creditors of the decedent transferor
are entitled to reach the nonprobate property. In still other areas (joint
property, community property agreements, section 11.02.090 trans-
fers), the legislature has purported not to derogate from existing credi-
tors' rights, but has failed to give any clear answer as to what those
rights are. On top of all this, there is no established procedure under
which creditors may seek to enforce what rights they do have to non-
probate property at the death of the debtor, and there is no fixed time
limit under which those claims will be cut off. A careful interpretation
of the UFTA may provide some relief to creditors in the case of some
kinds of nonprobate property, but any prediction that the courts of
this state would adopt such an interpretation of the Act would be
speculative. Property owners, creditors, and estate planners should
not need to wait for judicial clarification. The existing confusion
should be remedied with legislation that attempts to deal with the
problem in a unified and rational manner. This Article has made a
start by proposing one form such legislation might take.
APPENDIX
PROPOSED STATUTES TO DEAL WITH CREDITORS'
CLAIMS AGAINST NONPROBATE ASSETS
I. Nonclaims bar effective to protect nonprobate transferees.
Section 1. The last paragraph of RCW 11.40.010, as amended in 1989,
shall be amended to read as follows:
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Except as otherwise provided in RCW 11.40.011 or section 4 of this act,
any claim not filed within the four-month time limitation shall be for-
ever barred, if not already barred by any otherwise applicable statute of
limitations. This bar shall be effective to bar claims against both the pro-
bate estate of the decedent and any property received by means of a non-
probate transfer as defined in subsection 5(b) below. Proof by affidavit of
the giving and publication of such notice shall be filed with the court by
the personal representative.
II. Amendment of Creditors' Proviso in RCW 26.16.120
Section 2. The language of RCW 26.16.120 following the word "Pro-
vided" shall be amended to read as follows:
Provided, however, That such agreement shall not derogate from the
right of creditors, nor be construed to curtail the powers of the superior
court to set aside or cancel such agreement for fraud or under some
other recognized head of equity jurisdiction, at the suit of either party.
Property subject to such an agreement shall be liable for the debts of a
deceased spouse to the extent of the decedent's"ownership interest therein
immediately prior to death.
III. Amendment of Joint Tenancy Proviso in RCW 64.28.010.
Section 3. The language of RCW 64.28.010 following the word "Pro-
vided" shall be amended to read as follows:
Provided, That such transfers shall not derogate from the rights of credi-
tors. Property held in joint tenancy form with right of survivorship shall
be subject to the debts of a deceased joint tenant upon the death of that
joint tenant to the extent of the decedent's ownership interest therein
immediately prior to death.
IV. Nonclaims bar where no personal representative has been
appointed.
Section 4. A new section is added to chapter 11.40 RCW to read as
follows:
RCW 11.40.xxx. (a) Where an adjudication of testacy has been obtained
under RCW 11.20.020, or an adjudication of intestacy under RCW
11.28.110, but no personal representative has been appointed, the person
obtaining the adjudication of testacy or intestacy shall be entitled to give
notice to the creditors of the deceased in the same manner as would a
personal representative under RCW 11.40.010 and related sections.
Where no adjudication of testacy or intestacy has been obtained, and no
personal representative has been appointed, any trustee having authority
over the decedent's property or, in the absence of such trustee, any per-
son who has received property by reason of the decedent's death, shall
be entitled to give notice to the creditors of the decedent in the same
manner as would a personal representative under RCW 11.40.010 and
related sections.
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(b) The notice to creditors given by such persons shall be substantially
in the form provided by RCW 11.40.015, except that the notice shall
include the name, address, and date of death of the deceased, include the
circumstances of the adjudication of testacy or intestacy, if any; and
advise creditors to file any claims with the person giving the notice in
lieu of a personal representative. The notice shall also inform creditors
that no personal representative has been appointed and of their right to
petition for appointment as personal representative of the estate under
RCW 11.28.120(4). Any claim not filed with the person giving the
notice within the time limitations under this chapter for serving and
filing of claims shall be forever barred, as provided in RCW 11.40.010.
Where a claim is timely filed under this section, the person giving notice
shall allow or reject the claim within the time limits and in the same
manner required of personal representatives under RCW 11.40.030.
The claimant whose claim has been rejected shall be entitled to bring
suit against any person who has received nonexempt property from the
decedent within the time limit set out in RCW 11.40.030 for actions
against the personal representative.
(c) If, at any time after notice has been given under this section, it
should appear that appointment of a personal representative of the
estate is necessary to settle or otherwise dispose of claims made, either
the claimant or the person giving notice under this section may petition
the court for appointment of a personal representative. Upon appoint-
ment of such a personal representative, the personal representative shall
administer the decedent's estate to the extent, and under the conditions
specified by the court.
V. Creditors' claims against nonprobate assets.
Section 5. A new section is added to chapter 11.40 RCW to read as
follows:
RCW 11.40.zzz. (a) Except insofar as expressly exempted from credi-
tors' claims by statute, a nonprobate transfer shall not be effective to
vest in or transfer to a nonprobate transferee property that may be
needed to pay debts, taxes, and expenses of administration of a decedent.
A nonprobate transferee shall be liable to account to the personal repre-
sentative or, if none, to the creditors of a decedent for property benefi-
cially owned by the decedent immediately before death as separate
property or by the decedent and the surviving spouse as their commu-
nity property. No proceeding to assert this liability shall be commenced
unless the [PR], or if there is none, the person giving notice under [sec-
tion 2 above], has received a written claim by a creditor of the decedent.
No proceeding to assert this liability shall be commenced later than
three months after the final determination of tax for the decedent as
provided under RCW 83.110.070 unless an extension of this time limit
has been granted by the court for good cause.
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(b) For purposes of this Act, "nonprobate transfer" means any trans-
fer of an interest in property, other than by will, that is designed to take
effect at or after the death of the person owning that interest. "Nonpro-
bate transfer" includes, but is not limited to, transfer by means of com-
munity property agreement, joint tenancy with right of survivorship,
joint bank account with right of survivorship, a payable on death or
trust bank account, deed or conveyance where possession has been post-
poned until the death of the owner, inter vivos trust provision effective
at the death of the settlor, or payable on death provision in a contract.
"Nonprobate transfer" also includes forgiveness of a debt or a promise
that ceases to be subject to an obligation to pay or to be performed by
reason of the death of one of the parties to the agreement.
(c) Where a personal representative has been appointed and it has
been determined under this section that nonprobate property is neces-
sary to pay debts, taxes, or expenses of administration, nonprobate prop-
erty recovered by the [PR] shall be administered as part of the
decedent's estate to the extent necessary to satisfy the claims needing to
be paid. For purposes of abatement, such property shall be treated as if
it had been a specific bequest, unless the decedent provides to the con-
trary by will.
(d) A decedent shall be deemed to have "beneficially owned" property
immediately before death if and to the extent that the decedent retained
until death the power to possess, enjoy, or consume the property, or to
revoke, alter, or amend the disposition of the property.
